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1DEMOCRACY AND TORT LAW IN AMERICA: 
 THE COUNTER- REVOLUTION 
Christopher J. Roederer*
ABSTRACT 
Although the seeds of democracy and democratic tort reform were sown well before America’s 
founding, neither began to blossom until after the Second World War.  Democratic progress from 
the 1950s to the 1970s led to, and was in part consolidated by, progressive developments in tort 
law during the same period.  Unfortunately, the last quarter century has been a period of 
democratic decay in America and just as the revolution in tort law was bound up with democratic 
progress, the counter-revolution in tort law has tracked and reinforced the waning of American 
democracy since the 1980s.  Although a few authors have touched on the issue, there has been no 
in-depth treatment of the relationship between tort reform and democratic change in the legal 
literature. This article takes a step to fill that gap. This article draws on recent literature in 
economics, political science and democratic theory to demonstrate the extreme degree of 
economic inequality in America and how economic inequality has led to political inequality, 
both in terms of having a voice and in terms of being listened to by those who govern.  Gross 
inequality in political voice is bound up with a lack of responsiveness and accountability by the 
nation’s leaders and this in turn leads to the erosion of government interventions to correct or 
counterbalance the ever widening gap between the political and economic “haves” and “have-
nots” in America. Regressive tort reform is a predictable outcome of this state of American 
democracy.  Here, the voices of the majority are not only drowned out by an economically and 
politically powerful minority, but they are also distorted by a campaign of disinformation driven 
by that minority, which further skews the political process surrounding this issue. The effects of 
this distorted process are illustrated by counter-democratic interventions by the Supreme Court, 
as well as the bulk of tort “reform” efforts since the 1980s, both of which have worked against 
the interests of the majority of Americans by further entrenching inequality.  The article 
concludes by commenting on recent developments in the area of products liability that suggest 
that if people see clearly what is at stake in the debate over tort “reform” they may react 
progressively, putting torts back to work for democracy. 
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3“Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American Democracy in Rare 
Nonpartisan Statement,”1
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY AND TORT REFORM IN AMERICA 
At the same time the U.S. has spent billions of dollars and has put the lives of its soldiers 
on the line for the purported purpose of spreading democracy in other countries,2 Americans 
have allowed their own democracy to come under threat.  The threat does not come from abroad 
but is homegrown.  It is bound up in a vicious cycle of both economic and political inequality, 
the centrifugal forces of which have created an ever widening gap between those who have and 
those who do not have: 
• a stake in America,  
• a voice and hand in shaping this America’s future,  
• and the ears of others who are shaping that future.  
This gap between the “haves” and “have nots” cuts across both socio-economic aspects 
of life (education, jobs, income, mobility) and civil and political aspects of life (the ability to 
 
1 Press Release, American Political Science Association, Leading Political Scientists Warn of Threat to American 
Democracy in Rare Nonpartisan Statement (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcepress.pdf.  See also E. 
J. Dionne Jr., Poor Version of Democracy, WASHINGTON POST, June 11, 2004, at A25 (calling attention to and 
commenting on the Task Force report), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A33144-
2004Jun10.html.  Although not conceived as such, this article, in effect, is a response to the challenge raised by 
Nockleby and Curreri, “that those who wish to defend the civil justice system against retrenchment should explicitly 
address how the legal system changed from 1900 to 1980 to grant far more protections to citizens.”  John T. 
Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1021, 1023 (2005). 
2 There have been over 50,000 civilian casualties since the beginning of the Iraq war and over 3,000 U.S. military 
casualties. U.S. deaths in Iraq reach 3,000, CNN, Jan. 3, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/01/01/iraq.deathtoll/index.html.  By the end of 2006 the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees estimated that Some 3 million Iraqis had been displaced (about half within the country and half outside of 
the country).  Patrick Cockburn, Review of the Year: Iraq (A Nation Soaked in Blood Tears Itself Apart), THE 
INDEPENDENT, Dec., 29, 2006, http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2110653.ece.  The economic 
costs are well over 300 billion for Iraq alone and over 400 billion if Afghanistan and other expenditures on the war 
on terror are included.  AMY BELASCO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN 
AND THE OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR EXPENDITURES SINCE 9/11 4 tbl.1 (2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf. 
4participate in civic and political life, through voting, volunteering, protesting, donating, etc.). 
This gap both skews the input into those who are elected to represent the people and the output, 
or the responsiveness of government to the needs and preferences of the people.  Gross 
inequality in political voice is bound up with a lack of responsiveness and accountability and this 
in turn leads to the erosion of government interventions to correct or counterbalance the ever 
widening gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” in America.  As Part IV below illustrates, 
interventions by the courts and legislators in the area of tort law follows this pattern.  This is 
illustrated by counter-democratic interventions by the Supreme Court as well as the bulk of tort 
“reform” efforts since the 1980s. 
For democracy to be meaningful people must have some degree of stake in their 
country’s future.  Without a stake there is little reason to participate or to contribute – if one 
wants buy-in, there needs to be something to buy-into.  If people are going to lend their voices 
and hands to the future of America they should have not only something to gain, but something 
to lose should that project fail.   
No one expects American democracy to be primarily direct, either in the sense of the 
people directly making decisions about how the U.S. is governed, or in the sense of getting direct 
results from one’s input.  It is an accepted fact that most contributions are contributions to a 
process that must be mediated by institutions that one hopes are democratically representative 
and accountable.  Further, the vote is but one mechanism for ensuring that officials represent the 
people.  For democracy to operate between elections the people not only need a voice, they need 
to reach the ears of those who govern. 
The account of how American democracy has been run off its tracks presented in this 
article is not based on an elaborate or idealistic view of democracy.  It is not based on shattering 
5the illusion of direct democratic participation, or on the dream of a truly deliberative democracy,3
or even a republican democracy.4 The standard that is being proposed to measure or evaluate the 
health of American democracy is not the equal provision of conditions for human development 
and self actualization, 5 nor even the ideal of equal concern and respect, although the U.S. is 
faltering on all these accounts.6 The critique that follows is based on the failure of even 
achieving the modest ambitions of representative democracy.  The standard is based on the basic 
notions propounded by one of America’s greatest presidents and one of America’s foremost 
democratic theorists, namely, that democracy consists of “government of the people, by the 
people, for the people"7 and that a “key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political 
equals.”8 Democracy requires accountability and respect for the rule of law and this entails 
equality before the law.  It also requires transparency and access to accurate information, for 
 
3 The argument does not rely on a conception of democracy that is as rich as deliberative democracy, which requires 
not only that representatives represent the populace, but that they should have inclusive deliberations about the 
decisions they make and justify their decision with publicly acceptable reasons.  AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 (2004).   
4 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Three Normative Models of Democracy, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 21 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (comparing liberal, republican and deliberative forms 
of democracy).  
5 McPherson identifies the underlying moral value of democracy as “provid[ing] the conditions for the free 
development of human capacities, and to do this equally for all members of society.”  C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL 
WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 58 (1966). 
6 Ronald Dworkin’s view of our Constitution is “that it aims to create . . . a "partnership" rather than a majoritarian 
form of democracy by insisting that all citizens are entitled to an equal role and voice in their self-government, that 
government at all levels must treat citizens with equal concern, and that government must leave individual citizens 
free to make the personal decisions for themselves that they cannot yield to others without compromising their self-
respect.”  Ronald Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, 52 NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 16 ( 2005) 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18330#fnr6 (referring to his elaboration of this ideal in RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW (1996) and RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE (2000)). 
7 Abraham Lincoln, 16th President of the United States of America (1861-65), The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 
1863).  The U.S. State Department begins its discussion of the definition of “What is Democracy” with Lincoln’s 
definition.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WHAT IS DEMOCRACY? (1998), 
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm. 
8 ROBERT DAHL, POLIARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1 (1971).  Although the view of Democracy 
expounded by Dahl is not as rich or substantive as the requirements for political justice put forward by John Rawls, 
it is consistent with them. In fact, although it is not a sufficient condition for political justice, it is probably a 
necessary condition. See the discussion of Rawls’ principles of justice at infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. 
On Rawls’ account and the account detailed below, economic inequality becomes problematic from the standpoint 
of capitalist democracy when it undermines political equality and fair equality of opportunity. See id. 
6without it, “the people” have no chance of authentic participation, or of holding representatives 
accountable.  As will be detailed below, American democracy is failing, because its government 
is not, of, or for the people; those who govern are not responsive to the people.  This is both true 
in general and in the specific case of tort reform. 
Although it is not uncommon to hear of references to the founding as a democratic 
founding, 9 this is not an accurate depiction of American history.  It took the United States nearly 
200 years to achieve a level of political participation which would justify the claim that it was a 
democracy.  As C.B. MacPherson pointed out long ago, 
 
In our Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed until after the 
liberal society and the liberal state were firmly established.  Democracy came as a 
top dressing. It had to accommodate itself to the soil that had already been 
prepared by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market society, and by 
the operation of the liberal state, which served that society through a system of 
competing though not democratic political parties.  It was the liberal state that was 
democratized, and in the process, democracy was liberalized.10 
Democracy did not begin to take root in America until well into the 20th Century and it 
took till the 1960s for it to really begin to blossom.  It is difficult to speak at all about American 
 
9 See, e.g. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835); Lance Banning, Preface to LIBERTY AND 
ORDER: THE FIRST AMERICAN PARTY STRUGGLE xiii, xiii (Lance Banning ed., 2004) (describing our revolution as 
the first democratic revolution).  Even Jay Feinman refers to the United States at its founding as “the newly 
democratic” America.  JAY M. FEINMAN, UNMAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE 
COMMON LAW 56 (2004).  
10 MACPHERSON, supra note 5, at 5. 
7democracy prior to 1920 when women finally won the right to vote,11 and as Alexander Keyssar 
notes, despite the much earlier formal emancipation of African Americans, until the 1960s most 
African Americans could not vote in the South.12 “As late as 1950s, basic political rights were 
denied [not only to those blacks in the South but] . . . . to significant pockets of voters elsewhere, 
including the illiterate in New York, Native Americans in Utah, many Hispanics in Texas and 
California, and the recently mobile everywhere.”13 
Tort reform since the 1980’s has largely consisted of tort retrenchment to the 1950’s and 
before.  The notion that the current wave of retrenchment is compatible with democracy may be 
based, in part, on the misconception that the founding was democratic,14 and that the U.S. has 
been a democratic republic ever since.  However, the classical liberal state was not democratic at 
its inceptions and thus it should not be surprising that the common law and tort law as they 
existed at the time of the founding were similarly not supportive of democracy.15 The common 
law system largely presumed equality and freedom while exploiting the lack thereof, for 
example, by limiting access to courts for the poor, allowing those with superior bargaining power 
 
11 U.S. CONST. amend XIX.  Note that 12 of the western territories along with New York extended the franchise to 
women before the Amendment. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF 
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 211-218 app. at 390 (2001) (Table A.20 States and Territories Fully 
Enfranchising Women Prior to the Nineteenth Amendment).   
12 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at xvi. 
13 Id. at 316.  Universal suffrage is not a right enshrined in our Constitution. 
14 As David C. Williams notes, the American Revolution was a conservative revolution; the revolutionaries claimed 
that they were defending the British Constitution from the British Crown and Parliament.  David C. Williams, The 
Constitutional Right to “Conservative” Revolution, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV 413, 414, 430-31 (1997).  Although 
the U.S. eventually went somewhat further in creating republican legislatures and in protecting natural rights, rather 
than merely the customary rights of Englishmen, the bulk of U.S. constitutional structures and rights derived directly 
from British structures and rights.  Id. 431.  See also JOHN REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN LIBERTY (2005) (arguing that justifications for the American revolution were grounded in claims that 
Britain was violating the “Ancient Constitution” otherwise known as “the common law tradition,” and that 
revolutionary calls were actually justified as restorative rather than revolutionary).        
15 The lawyers who were largely responsible for articulating, developing and defending the English common law 
which the U.S. inherited (Coke, Seldon and Hale) were apposed to the absolutist theories of monarchical power as 
advocated by the Stuart Kings, but they also “accepted as natural monarchical government, a very limited franchise, 
and a patriarchal and profoundly inegalitarian social order that doled out privileges on the basis of status and 
sanctioned various forms of servitude.”  John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process 
and the right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 532 (2005).  
8to bind and keep the gains of unequal power through contract and tort law and by providing 
remedies that replicated status quo inequalities.  It was not until the early 1900s that tort law 
started its modern trend towards the expansion of liability, a movement that really did not take 
off until the 1960s.16 
The 1960s and 1970s were decades of considerable progress in civil and political rights 
as well as in socio-economic rights.17 These advances came from increased political 
participation,18 and from executive,19 legislative20 and judicial developments.21 These were also 
the years in which American democracy was further consolidated through progressive reform of 
the common law in general and torts in particular.22 It was not mere coincidence that progressive 
 
16 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 53.  
17 President Carter even signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1977, 
although it was never ratified by Congress.  See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES (2004), available 
at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.  
18 Paul Allen Beck & M. Kent Jennings, Political Periods and Political Participation, 73 THE AM. POL. SCI. REV.
737 (1979); Thomas E. Cavanagh, Changes in American Voter Turnout, 1964-1976, 96 POL. SCI. Q. 53 (1981); 
Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the Rise of Consumer Advocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 
899 (2005). 
19 For instance, The War on Poverty introduced by Lyndon B. Johnson during his State of the Union address (Jan. 8, 
1964), as well as proposed legislation that culminated in the Economic Opportunity Act and the Establishment of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity.   
20 See, e.g., The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963); Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 
 Pub. L. No. 88-452, § 1, 78 Stat. 508 (1964); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title II, § 201, 78 Stat. 
243 (1964); Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 86-778, Title VII, § 701(a)-(e), 74 Stat. 992, 993 (1965); and 
The Age Discrimination Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 2, 81 Stat. 602 (1967). Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title 
VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253. The EEOC obtained enforcement authority under the Equal Opportunity Act of 1972; Pub. 
L. No. 92-318, Title IX, 86 Stat. 235 (1972) (Education Amendments prohibit sex discrimination in all aspects of 
education programs that receive federal money); The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 
Stat. 2076 (1978). 
21 For a list of landmark cases, see, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The 
American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1 app. 1 (2002).    
22 See infra Part IV. B.  Although torts still reflected social inequalities, the reforms during the 60s provided easier 
access to courts and better protection for consumers.  As George Priest notes, "since 1960, our modern civil liability 
regime has experienced a conceptual revolution that is among the most dramatic ever witnessed in the Anglo-
American legal system."  George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundation of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).  Constitutional torts also emerged 
during this period, with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
9tort reform tracked the coming to age of American democracy.  It was made possible by the 
democratic gains of the 1960s and 1970s and helped consolidate and protect those gains.  
Since the 1980s those democratic gains have been eroding.  As Keyssar states, “Although 
the formal right to vote is now nearly universal, few observers would characterize the United 
States as a vibrant democracy.”23 In 2004 the American Political Science Association came out 
with its warning that American democracy was in peril.  They did so with the press release 
quoted at the beginning of this article,24 and through a set of reports commissioned by the 
Association.25 Those reports located the cause of this demise in the widening gap between rich 
and poor. As its authors state, “progress toward realizing the American ideals of democracy may 
have stalled, and in some arenas reversed” due to the broadening gap in income and wealth in 
America.26 
Arguably, the U.S. has had a number of constitutional revolutions since its founding.27 
Few, if any, would argue that these revolutions, past or present, have been as fundamental as the 
many democratic revolutions that took place around the world in the late 1980s and early 
 
23 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 4, 322.  For the view that our democracy is crumbling based on current obstacles to 
voting see SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION (2006). 
24 Press Release, supra note 1. 
25 The task force compiled a series of reports in 2004: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF RISING INEQUALITY;
THREE CRITICAL ANALYSES ON ECONOMIC, GENDER, RACIAL, AND ETHNIC INEQUALITIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS; and 
a set of teaching materials.  Apsanet.org, Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy, 
http://www.apsanet.org/section_256.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).  These materials were edited into a book. 
INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE NEED TO LEARN (Lawrence Jacobs & 
Theda Skocpol eds., 2005). 
26 TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY& AM. DEMOCRACY, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF 
RISING INEQUALITY 1 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/taskforcereport.pdf.  This is not to say that healthy 
levels of economic inequality are antithetical to democracy.  As is argued below in section II however, certain levels 
and certain forms of economic inequality become problematic from the standpoint of democracy when they either 
undermine fair equality of opportunity or our civil and political liberties.  
27 According to Ackerman, the US has gone through three historical ruptures or transitions brought about by 
heightened democratic participation resulting in “higher law making”: the extra legal Founding which did not follow 
the procedures set out in the articles of Confederation, the 13th and 14th Reconstruction amendments which bypassed 
the proper Article V procedures and the New Deal amendments which took place largely through the pressure 
brought to bear on the courts to switch in time in order to save the nine Supreme Court justices from having to share 
the bench with a few more judges.  BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42-44 (1991).  Unlike these 
constitutional moments the current revolution is not a democratic moment of higher law making.   
10
1990s.28 Even fewer would consider the U.S. to be in the throes of a revolution, or in the recent 
aftermath of such a revolution.29 Yet, a number of commentators have characterized the 
culmination of changes brought about by the Rehnquist Court over the last two decades in these 
very terms.30 Andrew Siegel recently noted that those commentating on the history of the 
Rehnquist Court are nearly uniform in their view that “Chief Justice Rehnquist and his allies on 
the Court instigated a judicial "revolution" that has fundamentally altered both the substance of 
American law and the institutional arrangements through which we develop and enforce legal 
norms.”31 
Properly speaking, these changes have been reactionary or counter-revolutionary and are 
routinely described in undemocratic terms.  For instance, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson 
place the Court's contraction of congressional power at the core of this "constitutional 
revolution."32 Or, as Larry Kramer puts it: 
 
28 See RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 206-209 (2002) (arguing that our founding revolution was 
conservative compared to many of the legal transitions that took place around the world in the 90s).   
29 Perhaps the U.S. is now in a phase of consolidation.  As Andrew Siegel puts it, “In rough cut, one might suggest 
that the years prior to 1994 represent rehearsal and experimentation with the agenda for the Rehnquist Revolution, 
the period from 1994 until 2002 or 2003, the years of the Revolution, and the years since then a period of 
consolidation or retrenchment.”  Andrew Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an 
Organizing Them in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1112 (2006).   
30 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., THE REHNQUIST REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, IN THE REHNQUIST 
COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 55 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term--
Foreword: We The Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 130 (2001); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The 
Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 370 (2002) (critiquing the 
"federalism revolution"); cf. Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court,
78 IND. L. J. 47, 49-52 (2003) (taking a "modest" view of the Court's rulings); Dawn Johnson, Ronald Reagan and 
the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. J. 363, 
364 (2003) (remaining agnostic about the “revolution”).   
31 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1100.  
32 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 30, at 1045 (noting the revolution and criticizing the bare majority of the Court 
which has systematically reappraised the doctrines of federalism, racial equality, and civil rights, and who also gave 
the presidency to George W. Bush). 
11
The defining characteristic of [the Rehnquist Court] is . . . . the Justices' 
conviction that they and they alone are responsible for the Constitution . . . . 
[A]ny notion that what the Constitution does or permits might best be left for the 
people to resolve using the ordinary devices available to express their will seems 
beyond the Rehnquist Court's compass.33 
The counter-revolution is undemocratic, both because of the usurpation of the power of 
Congress and of the people and because of the erosion of mechanisms developed over time to 
hold government accountable and to keep democracy on track.  According to Sylvia Law, the 
Supreme Court has limited the ability of Congress to address national problems to a degree only 
matched by the Lochner Court’s interference with attempts by Congress and the president to 
respond to the Great Depression. 34 This includes: restricting the constitutional power of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; expanding state immunity from federally defined claims of unfair labor practices 
and discrimination; and “rejecting settled interpretations of federal civil rights laws to limit the 
protection that Congress has sought to give to the civil and economic rights of many vulnerable 
people, including older people, people with disabilities, women, and working people.”35 
It may come as little surprise that this counter-revolution tracks the decline in American 
Democracy.  It may come as more of a surprise that both of these changes track the onslaught of 
regressive tort reform in the U.S.36 Part IV below, addresses the supporting role the Supreme 
Court has played in the regressive tort reform movement.  This is not to say that the Supreme 
 
33 Kramer, supra note 30, at 158. 
34 Law, supra note 30, at 371. 
35 Id. at 371-72. 
36 As Goldberg points out, arguing that that private law is integrally connected to public law runs against the grain of 
academic wisdom.  Goldberg, supra note 15, at 530. 
12
Court has played a leading role in this movement, but the mere fact that the Supreme Court is 
involved at all is notable.  It is testament to the fact that the present counter-democratic changes 
that are taking place are not merely economic or political, or limited to broad public law areas 
like federalism.  Rather, these changes are pervasive, cutting across the public and private law 
domains.   
There is very little written in the legal literature connecting tort reform to constitutional 
change, 37 much less democratic change,38 although some have been arguing for years that tort 
law reflects and further entrenches the inequalities that exist in the U.S.,39 and numerous writers 
have noted that he recent wave of tort “reform” has been a product of powerful corporate interest 
groups and a campaign of disinformation.40 
37 But see Jo Ellen Lind, "Procedural Swift": Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values,
37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 719 (2004) (arguing that federal legislation moving class actions into federal courts posses 
risks to the role of states in promoting the democratic values of political participation, transparency, and 
accountability); Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 533, 556 (1999) (arguing that in the arena of tort reform “that courts tend to be populist and deliberative, 
whereas legislatures tend to be captured by special interests, secretive, hasty, and unwilling or unable to offer 
reasons for their actions”); Goldberg, supra note 15 (arguing for a Constitutional Right to an adequate legal scheme 
for the redress of wrongs); George L. Priest, The Constitutionality of State Tort Reform Legislation and Lochner, 31 
SETON HALL L. REV. 683, 683 (2001).  There are many articles written on the subject of constitutional torts, see, 
e.g., Thomas A. Eaton, Symposium: Re-examining First Principles: Deterrence and Corrective Justice in 
Constitutional Torts, 35 GA. L. REV. 837 (2001); and for the relationship between state constitutions and tort law, 
see John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159 
(2005).   
38 Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig come very close to linking democracy and tort reform when they label 
the period from 1945 to 1980 “the Democratic Expansionary Era.” Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 4.  Although 
the facts perhaps speak for themselves, Rustad and Koenig do not explain why the period from 1945 to 1980 is an 
era of democratic expansion and they do not argue that the current era is a period of democratic contraction.  
Nockleby & Curreri note that the first wave of tort neo-liberal tort reform began in the 1970s.  Nockleby & Curreri, 
supra note 1, at 1030-31.  Jay Feinman also comes close to connecting the “un-making” of the common law to 
democratic decay. FEINMAN, supra note 9.  While Feinman places the blame on “radical conservatives,” “the right” 
and/or “Republicans,” the problem of unresponsiveness cuts across party lines. For examples of regressive 
legislation (including tort reform) and policies during the Clinton presidency see infra notes 67, 77, and 216. 
39 The most prominent example is Richard Abel.  See, e.g., Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis--Too Few Claims, 48 
OHIO ST. L. J. 443 (1987); Richard Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRITISH J. L. & SOC’Y 199-231 (1981) 
(Reprinted in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Allan Hutchinson ed., Rowman & Littlefield, 1989)); Richard Abel, 
General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea),
55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253 (2006).  See also Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in Tort 
Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (arguing that deep biases in tort law result in higher damage awards for white men than 
for women and minorities). 
40 See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages' Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1300 
(2005) (“The story of the punitive damages recoil is a familiar one about special legislation to help corporate 
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If these commentators are correct, that the success of the regressive tort reform 
movement can be credited to political influence, power lobbying and “a campaign of 
misinformation [that] convinces people that reducing their rights is actually in their own 
interest,”41 then there is little room for question that the process behind this wave of tort reform 
is undemocratic.  As the argument in Parts II-III shows, regressive tort reform is a predictable 
outcome of the state of American democracy even without the “campaign of misinformation.”  
Nonetheless, this campaign of misinformation further erodes the democratic values of 
transparency and accountability, making it harder for truly democratic reforms to gain traction.  
It further distorts the already muted voices of the majority of Americans on this issue. 
To argue that the democratic gains of the 60s and 70s have come undone may sound 
slightly radical.42 It may not jibe with the average law review reader’s view of reality.  The idea 
that the United States is the “the model” of democracy for the world is well entrenched in the 
American psyche.  The fact that the U.S. has the longest standing written Constitution is often 
wrongly equated with the idea that the U.S. is one of, if not the, longest established 
democracies.43 However, American democracy is very young and even if the average law 
 
America.”).  Rustad also points to Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Report of the Governor's Commission on Tort 
and Liability Insurance Reform, 53 TENN. L. REV. 679, 680 (1986) (punitive damages reform is about special 
legislation for corporate America) and John W. Wade, Strict Products Liability: A Look at its Evolution, THE BRIEF,
1989, at 8, 56 (tort reform should be unconstitutional because it is special interest legislation).  See also Siegel, 
supra note 29, at 1147 (noting the substantial energies and resources spent by American businesses in their fight for 
constitutional protection against punitive damages); See also Abel, supra note 37; and FEINMAN, supra note 9.  For 
the view that the tort reform campaign is based on misinformation, see Abel, supra note 37; FEINMAN, supra note 9, 
at 48, 190-192; and Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21.  See also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCANN, DISTORTING 
THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004); See also THOMAS BAKER, THE MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005) (deconstructing the myths surrounding the calls for medical malpractice reform).  For 
misinformation concerning punitive damages, see Eisenberg, infra note 268.  See also infra section IV.   
41 Id. at 19.  See also Lind, supra note 37, at 719; Abel, supra note 37, at 556; Goldberg, supra note 15; Priest, supra 
note 37, at 683; Eaton, supra note 37; Witt, supra note 37.  See also infra notes 171-179 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of this phenomenon. 
42 The argument that follows does not depend on any “radical” or socialist view of the state or democracy.  The 
point is not “put down” the ailing “golden goose” out of envy because others have more, but to nurture the goose 
back to life by reinvigorating the principles that sustain her.   
43 Thirteen countries extended the franchise to women before the United States.  Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia,   
http://ap.grolier.com/article?assetid=0279670-0&templatename=/article/article.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).  
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review reader is correct to think that he or she does, or could have, not only a stake in, but a 
voice in, the political system,44 this is not the case for the majority of Americans.  
It is not expected that this proposition be taken on faith, and thus the remainder of this 
article will put forth evidence detailing how large the gap is between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-
nots’ in the U.S. political and economic system, as well as how the rising inequality gap is bound 
up with losses in socio-economic and political stake, political voice, and losses in political 
responsiveness and accountability.45 The spiraling downward pressure of both socio-economic 
and political inequality has resulted in unresponsive legislation and policies, including tort 
reform that is contrary to the needs and interests of the majority of Americans.  Unlike the tort 
reform that helped consolidate American democracy in the 60s and 70s, the tort reform of the 
last two decades has acted to further entrench and consolidate oligarchy if not plutocracy.  This 
article will draw on contrasting trends in Europe to illustrate and support these points.  
II. ECONOMIC INEQUALITY: THE EROSION OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY’S FOUNDATION 
A.  Introduction 
Few, if any, in America or elsewhere are arguing for communist style economic 
equality.46 There is little to no support for the view that at the end of the day, Americans should 
all have an equal income or equal wealth, no matter how talented, hard working or even lucky 
one may be.47 Nonetheless, economic inequality becomes problematic from the standpoint of 
 
44 It may be particularly difficult for law professors to imagine that they have little voice in American politics (see 
infra Part III below on the impact of academics on political responsiveness).  
45 In spite of the fact that surveys are biased against those with egalitarian views, Schlozman et al.’s survey results 
revealed substantial pro-egalitarian sentiments.  KAY L. SCHLOZMAN ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY & AM.
DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITIES OF POLITICAL VOICE 12-13 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/voicememo.pdf.  
Those pro-egalitarian sentiments are much stronger when it comes to the preferences of Americans for political 
equality than for economic quality.  Id. at 11, 17. 
46 Ronald Dworkin makes this point in RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 2 (2000). 
47 Ronald Dworkin would subject all choice independent luck-based economic inequality to redistribution including 
the luck of having or not having talent.  Id. at 90-91, 287.  Dworkin sees this as following from the principle of equal 
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democracy both when it reaches a point where it seriously undermines political equality and 
when it undermines fair equality of opportunity in the market.  
The principle of political equality is enshrined in John Rawls’ first principle of justice 
which requires that “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.” 48 As he states in his 
later work, “The fair value of the political liberties ensures that citizens similarly gifted and 
motivated have roughly an equal chance of influencing the government’s policy and of attaining 
positions of authority irrespective of their economic and social class.”49 For Rawls, equal 
citizenship is incompatible with allowing any trade-offs between economic inequality and one’s 
liberties.50 While his second principle of justice allows for economic inequality his first 
principle does not allow for political inequality.51 Americans tend to share this view in that they 
show overwhelming support for political equality,52 and are more comfortable with economic 
inequality than political inequality.53 
resources, which in turn follows from his principle that governments should show equal concern for the fate of each 
of its citizens.  Id. at 1, 65-119.  For Dworkin, equal concern is the sovereign virtue of political community.  Id. at 1.  
48 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).  The point of Rawls’ theory of justice, justice as fairness, is to 
provide a moral and philosophical basis for democratic institutions.  JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT 5 (2001).  Rawls does believe that his two principles of justice can be realized under either a property 
owning democracy or a liberal socialist regime, but not under a laissez-faire capitalist regime.  Id. at 137-38.  Ronald 
Dworkin shares this view.  Ronald Dworkin, Liberalism, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. Sandel ed., 
1984) (arguing for a social democratic form of liberalism).  For Dworkin, the demands of equality require either 
“redistributive capitalism or limited socialism—not in order to compromise the antagonistic ideal of efficiency and 
equality, but to achieve the best practical realization of the demands of equality itself.”  Id. at 69. 
49 RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, supra note 48, at 46.  
50 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 545 (1980).  As Wolff points out, the 
priority of liberty articulates Rawls’s conviction that mutual respect of equal citizenship expresses men’s recognition 
of one another’s moral personality and that “to bargain away a portion of one’s liberties for a softer life would, in 
Rawls’s view, be to sell one’s birthright as a human being for a mess of potage.”  ROBERT P. WOLFF,
UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A THEORY OF JUSTICE 88 (1977).  This is one way 
of embodying in his theory the Kantian injunction to “treat humanity, whether in oneself or others, always as an end 
and never merely as a means.”  Id.
51 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 48, at 302. Rawls’ second principle of justice requires that social and 
economic inequalities be arranged so that they are “attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity.”  Id. at 303. 
52 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 11, 15.  
53 Id. at 11, 17. 
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The goal, dream or myth of equal opportunity in a “land of opportunity” where people 
have a fair, if not equal, chance of achieving more is a fundamental principle undergirding our 
capitalist system.54 It is why movies like Rocky are so popular.  People accept a certain level of 
economic inequality based on the idea that those with less can have more if they have talent and 
if they put that talent to use in the market.  Income or wealth mobility based on fair equality of 
opportunity may even be counted as a fundamental principle of our capitalist democracy.  This 
principle draws its appeal both from an idea of fairness or desert where one gets out of the 
economic system in proportion to what one puts in, as well as from an idea of efficiency, namely 
that there will be more for everyone.  The later notion is based on the assumption that people will 
contribute more if their input into the system results in fair outputs from the system. 
It does not follow that the market provides fair equality of opportunity.  The capitalist 
market is not like a game of chess, an Olympic competition or even championship boxing where 
one wins a ribbon or a gold medal and the loser goes home to practice in the hopes of taking the 
ribbon, gold medal or belt the next time.  Left to its own, the market does not allow for 
comebacks on a level playing field.  It does not allow Ali, much less Rocky, to win the belt one 
more time, just because he has the talent and energy to do it.  It does not, because the market 
doesn’t merely dole out awards and prizes for those who win, it doles out money and other tools 
for winning the next round of competition.  It is more akin to each round of chess or checkers, 
where it becomes harder and harder to win, the less pieces one has. It is like those games in 
which one picks up more weapons and ammunition the more points one scores, thus making it 
easier to score.  As disheartening as it is to lose round after round to the bitter end, the game 
needs to end, and to entice one back to the game the playing field needs to be rebalanced.  Few if 
anyone would be willing to start the checker game or the boxing match where he or she left off, 
 
54 What John Rawls call fair equality of opportunity.  RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 302-03.  
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much less where one’s parents left off.  People want a fair chance to win the next game.  If it is 
desirable for people to contribute – then inequalities produced by the market should be harnessed 
and re-directed to make it worth participating in the market.  For instance, the fact that one’s 
parents were relative losers cannot be allowed to doom one’s children to being losers and thus, 
certain levels of health, education and general welfare are crucial for giving the “losers” what 
they need to get back in the game, to give them what they need to contribute and compete once 
again.  
The remainder of this section details the extent of economic inequality in America as 
compared to other economically advanced democracies in terms of income, wealth and mobility. 
It details both how unequal the U.S. is as a result of the market and how little the U.S. 
government does to rebalance the inequalities generated by the market.  The impact of these 
economic equalities on political equality will be tracked in the Part III below.  
B.  Income inequality  
For a short time, the impact of hurricane Katrina on the people of New Orleans brought 
American inequality into sharp relief.  As one commentator wrote, “Katrina’s whirlwind has laid 
bare the fault lines of race and class in America.  For a lightning moment, the American psyche 
was singed.”55 There appeared to be some hope that “the shock and shame” of Katrina might 
“strip away the old evasions, hypocrisies and not-so-benign neglect” surrounding issues of 
inequality in America.56 The overwhelming racial dimension to the impact of the hurricane no 
doubt further accentuated the contrast between the “haves” and the majority of African-
 
55 Johnathan Tilove, “Our Society is so Uneven”: Katrina Exposes Inequalities of Race, Wealth, TRENTON TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2005, at B1. 
56 Jonathan Alter, The Other America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42-48; Larry Bartels, Is the Water Rising? 
Reflections on Inequality and American Democracy, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 39 (2006) (hereinafter Bartels, Water 
Rising).  “Many Americans were shocked and shamed by the televised images of New Orleans in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina . . . . Thousands of residents, mostly Black and poor, seemed to be trapped in a Hobbesian state of 
nature, abandoned by government and civilized society. ”  Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 46.  
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American “have-nots.”  These socio-economic inequalities gave rise to fears of gross political 
inequality as significant worries of disenfranchisement abounded in the lead up to the first city 
elections since the hurricane, given the large numbers of poor African-Americans who were 
resettled outside the city.57 
However inconvenient it might be, gross inequality is not limited to New Orleans and 
other areas of drastic natural disaster.  Inequality is pervasive in our country.  As Appendix Table 
1 illustrates, the statistics on inequality show that among rich western nations the U.S. has the 
highest level of inequality by far.58 The U.S. has the largest gap between the bottom 10% of our 
population and the top 10% of our population as their income relates to the median income (the 
decile ratio gap).59 The U.S. also has the greatest degree of inequality when measured against all 
income distributions (the Gini coefficient gap)60 and our lowest 10% are significantly worse off 
than their European counterparts.61 Since WWII this gap has widened at a pace and to a degree 
unmatched by other economically advanced countries.62 
Converting these numbers to a standard grade curve (the bell or C curve commonly used 
in first year undergraduate courses) might bring them into perspective. Both the U.S.’s decile 
 
57 See, e.g., Marc Morano, Voter Disenfranchisement Predicted in New Orleans, CNSNEWS.COM, Mar. 9, 2006, 
http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewPolitics.asp?Page=%5CPolitics%5Carchive%5C200603%5CPOL20060309a.html; 
Jesse Jackson, Secret rolls undermine N. Orleans vote, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, available at 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4155/is_20060307/ai_n16177797. 
58 Andrea Brandolini & Timothy M. Smeeding, Patterns of Economic Inequality in Western Democracies: Some 
Facts on Level and Trends, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 21, 23 (2006); See also id. at 22 fig.1.   
59 The population in the bottom 10% income group receives only 39% of the median income while the top 10% 
receive 210% of the median income.  This results in a decile ratio in which the top 10% income group receives 5.45 
times what the bottom group receives.      
60 Id. at 22 (0 being perfectly equal and a 1 or 100% being perfectly unequal).  The US CIA fact book put the U.S. at 
45% for 2004 with a 2004 estimate of 12% of the population below the poverty line.  CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Geo (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).  To explain further, 
perfect equality means everyone has the same income (0) while perfect inequality means that one person has 
everything and the rest have nothing (1). 
61 Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 58, at 22 fig.1, available at http://www.lisproject.org/keyfigures.   
62 Lawrence Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Restoring the Tradition of Rigor and Relevance to Political Science, 39 PS: 
POL. SCI. & POL. 27 (2006) (referring to L. MISHEL ET. AL, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA (2005)).  See also 
Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 61, at 25 fig.3 & 4.  Jacobs and Skocpol report that as of 2003 the most affluent 
fifth of the population received 47.6% of family income while the top 5% received 21% of that income.  Jacobs & 
Skocpol eds., supra note 25. 
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ratio of 5.38 and its Gini coefficient of .369 are over 2 standard deviations away from the 
average. This puts both scores in the F range of a C curve.  While the next worst group of 
performing countries (i.e. Spain, Ireland, the U.K. and Italy) is in the C- to D- range, the U.S. is 
alone in the F range of the curve.    
C.  Post redistribution inequality 
Inequality in America is not merely due to market based inequalities but also due to a 
lack of intervention to mitigate the inequalities generated by the market.63 As Appendix Table 2 
shows, if one only looks at the inequality produced by the market, the U.S. is not much worse 
than many of these thirteen advanced capitalist states, and in fact Americans are more equal than 
the United Kingdom and France.  However, market interventions by way of taxes and benefits 
significantly dampen the disparity between the rich and poor in most of these countries.  These 
inequalities are reduced by 47% in France and over 30% in the U.K. while our government only 
dampens these inequalities by 22%.  While the average reduction in inequality is over 30%, the 
reduction in the U.S. is about 20%.  
Further, the data on Gini coefficient reduction through taxes and benefits does not include 
pensions or the public provision of education or health care, even though low or no cost 
provision of these benefits greatly reduces inequalities in what one can afford to consume.64 
Because educational provisions in most states in the U.S. are still based on local property values 
the distribution of this service entrenches and exacerbates the above inequalities within the U.S. 
No other country finances education in this way.65 There is also a significant gap in the 
 
63 Lane Kenworthy & Jonas Pontusson, Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in Affluent Countries, 3
PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 449 (2005), available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/pop2005.pdf.  This data does 
not reflect government spending on infrastructure, the military, or the civil and criminal justice system, which 
provide a disproportionate benefit to businesses and the wealthy. 
64 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 455. 
65 Allan Odden & William H. Clune, School Finance Systems: Aging Structures in Need of Renovation, 20 EDUC.
EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 157, 168-69 (1998).  For the intersection of law, race and education see Samuel R. 
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provision of health care between the U.S. and other O.E.C.D. (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) countries which significantly exacerbates the disposable income 
gap.66  This has a significant impact on those who are uninsured or under-insured.67 Between 
1973 and 2000, the income of the bottom 90% of U.S. tax payers fell by 7 percent while the 
income of the top 1% grew by 14 percent.68 
D.  Wealth inequality 
The bottom line of inequality is not so much how much income one has but how much 
wealth one has at the end of the day in terms of all one’s physical and financial assets minus 
one’s liabilities.  Unfortunately the situation is significantly worse if one looks at inequality in 
wealth rather than merely inequality in income.  The U.S. Gini coefficient based on wealth is a 
staggering .801.69 This is worse than the Gini value that would be generated in a ten person 
 
Lucas Paret & Marcel Paret, Annual Reviews, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 203 (2005), available at 
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/eprint/znK7y9nbHQND7hyTuGfb/full/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.1.041604.115
931?cookieSet=1. For facts on educational attainment by race see KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION FACT SHEET: YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MEN IN THE UNITED STATES (2006) (hereinafter KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION, FACT SHEET), http://www.kff.org/minorityhealth/upload/7541.pdf. 
66 Although Americans spend twice as much for health care than most O.E.C.D. countries, most of the burden is 
born by the private sector.  While the average O.E.C.D. country public expenditure on health as a percentage of total 
spending on health has consistently been over 70% (1980- 2005), the United States has averaged between 40% and 
45% from 1980 to 2005.  See OECD Health Data 2006 - Frequently Requested Data: Data on Public Expenditure on 
Health (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/49/35529832.xls.  
67 For information on the uninsured see, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, THE GROWING UNINSURED POPULATION AND 
THE HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET (hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, GROWING), 
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/profile.cfm. For statistics on provision of health care by race, see KAISER FAMILY 
FOUNDATION, FACT SHEET, supra note 65.  Insurance coverage may have a significant impact on law suits. As 
Reisman states, “where consumers are heavily insured but manufacturers and sellers go bare, there will be fewer 
product liability actions than in a jurisdiction where victims have little coverage but businesses hold large policies.” 
Mathias Reisman, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a 
Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 827 (2003).  See also Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the 
United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 47 (1999) (“the [British] National Health Service has 
in the past operated to relieve most tortfeasors from the costs of their victims' medical treatment.”).  
68 Heather Boushey & Christian E. Weller, Inequality and Household Economic Hardship 5 (United Nations Dep’t 
of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Working Paper No. 18, April 2006). 
69 JAMES B. DAVIES ET AL., THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD WEALTH 26 (2006), 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/2006-2007/2006-2007-1/wider-wdhw-launch-5-12-2006/wider-wdhw-report-5-
12-2006.pdf. 
The wealth data here is household wealth as of the year 2000.  As the authors of this report note, “Wealth data 
typically become available with a significant lag, and wealth surveys are conducted at intervals of three or more 
years.  The year 2000 provides us with a reasonably recent date and good data availability.”  Id. at 3 n.4. 
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group consisting of two people worth a million dollars each while everyone else’s combined net 
worth was eight thousand dollars (one thousand dollars each).70 The curve here is compressed 
compared to the income inequality curve.  There are no As and there are no Fs, but the U.S. does 
sit alone with Switzerland in the solid D range.   
E.  Lack of mobility 
At this point in time in America, about 50% of the differences in wealth in one’s parents’ 
generation show up in the present generation.71 Contrary to the belief of a majority of 
Americans, their chances of moving up the economic ladder are not as good as they were 30 
years ago. 72 For instance, sons in the bottom three quarters of the socio-economic scale in the 
90s had a lower chance of moving up than sons in the 1960s.73 What is more troubling is that 
household income inequality increased while those working within the household also 
increased.74 Without the contribution of wives, the income of the bottom fifth would have 
decreased by 13.9% between 1979 and 2000 rather than raising by 7.5%.75 Although the U.S. 
 
70 The actual gini coefficient generated by these numbers is .796.  The same result would be generated by two 
members of the group having $1,000 in wealth and eight having only $1.  For an accessible Gini calculator online 
see Free Statistics Software, Office for Research Development and Education, http://www.wessa.net/co.wasp (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2007).  
71 Emily Beller & Michael Hout, Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in Comparative Perspective 
16 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 19, 26-27 (2006) (This entire issue published by The Brookings institute and 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton is dedicated to Opportunity in America 1-
196).  The figure is 40% for intergenerational income inequality.  Id. at 25-26. 
72 See e.g., Janny Scott & David Leonhardt, Class Matters: Shadowy Lines that Still Divide, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/national/class/OVERVIEW-
FINAL.html?ex=1273809600&en=2fb756e388191419&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.  The New York Times 
poll indicated that over 75% of Americans thought that the chances of moving up the economic ladder were as good 
or better than they were 30 years ago.  Interactive Graphic, How Class Works, 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/national/20050515_CLASS_GRAPHIC/index_03.html (last visited Jan. 24, 
2007). 
73 Boushey & Weller, supra note 68, at 6 (citing Earl Wysong, Robert Perrucci, & David Wright, Organizations, 
Resources, and Class Analysis: The Distributional Model and the U.S. Class Structure (Ind. U. Working Paper, 
2004) (comparing the incomes and occupations of 2,749 fathers and sons from the 1970s to the late 1990s)). See 
also Beller & Hout, supra note 71, at 19, 27.  
74 Boushey & Weller, supra note 68, at 6.   
75 Id. The top fifth of incomes was not as heavily impacted by women entering the job market as was the bottom.  
Wives in families with children in the bottom fifth increased their working hours by 43.9% as compared to only a 
27.4% increase in working hours among wives in the top fifth.  Id. 
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has achieved an average performance in occupational mobility as compared to other “open” 
societies or countries that espouse the idea of equality of opportunity, it performs rather poorly 
when it comes to actual income mobility.76 As Beller and Hout note, the United States has high 
income inequality coupled with low income mobility whereas the Scandinavians have high 
income mobility and low income inequality.77 If American democracy is measured in part by the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, or by how well it approximates the ideal embodied in 
the title, “the land of opportunity,” it is falling well below the mark.    
III. POLITICAL INEQUALITY: UNDERMINING DEMOCRACY AND FURTHER ENTRENCHING 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
As early as 1955, Kuznet described the relationship between inequality and economic 
development in democratic terms. In that work he stated,  
 
In democratic societies the growing political power of the urban lower-income 
groups led to a variety of protective and supporting legislation, much of it aimed 
to counteract the worst effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization and to 
support the claims of the broad masses for adequate shares of the growing income 
of the country.78 
76 Beller & Hout, supra note 71, at 30.  
77 Id. Note that this is likely a result of how poorly the children in the United States fare in comparison with other 
rich countries. The U.S. ranks 20 out of 21 countries when it comes to the well-being of its children (with only the 
U.K. performing worse in this regard).  INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, UNICEF, CHILD POVERTY IN PERSPECTIVE:
AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD WELL-BEING IN RICH COUNTRIES 2 (2007), available at http://www.unicef-
icdc.org/publications/ (this ranking is a combined ranking based on: material well-being, family and peer 
relationships, health and safety, behavior risks, and both educational well-being and subjective well-being).  The 
four Scandinavian countries are in the top 7 of this ranking, i.e. Sweden is at number 2, Denmark at 3, Finland at 4, 
and Norway at 7.  Id. See also Table 5 infra p. 71.  
78 Simon Kuznet, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 17 (1955). 
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However, in recent years lower income groups have failed to secure such “protective and 
supporting legislation,” and the legislation that is on the books has been scaled back, and under-
enforced,79 leaving the poor and lower income groups to the vicissitudes of the market. For 
instance, Bill Clinton’s Welfare Reform of 1996 removed many important features of the U.S. 
welfare safety net.80 If Kuznet is correct, something has gone wrong with American democracy, 
or at least with the ability of lower-income groups to press to have their needs addressed in the 
U.S.81 
The impact of the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” on our democracy is 
explored in detail in the American Political Science Association task force Reports on Inequality 
and American Democracy.82 As two of the authors state: 
 
[The report] concluded that the privileged participate more than others and are 
increasingly well organized to press their demands on government. Public 
officials, in turn, are much more responsive to the privileged than to average 
citizens and the least affluent. Citizens with lower or moderate incomes speak 
with a whisper that is lost on the ears of inattentive government officials, while 
 
79 One example that resonates with tort reform is the E.E.O.C.  See, e.g., Marni Goldberg, Job-Discrimination 
Claims Pile Up With Budget Cuts, CHI. TRIBUNE, June 17, 2006, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-eeoc17jun17,1,7666899.story?coll=la-headlines-nation (The 
claims backlog at the EEOC, which has lost 20% of its staff since 2001, grew 12% last year resulting in a backlog of 
over 33,000 claims; the backlog is expected to grow to 48,000 by 2007 while Bush is proposing another 4 million 
dollar reduction in funding).  
80 See JACOB HACKER ET AL., TASK FORCE ON INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC 
POLICY 14 (2004), http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/feedbackmemo.pdf.   As Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez 
note in Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998, CXVIII THE Q. J. OF ECON. 1, 1-2 (2003), “Kuznet’s 
curve is widely held to have doubled back on itself, especially in the United States, with the period of falling 
inequality observed during the first half of the twentieth century being succeeded by a very sharp reversal of the 
trend since the 1970s.”   
81 Or, the U.S. is in a new industrial revolution (i.e. the computer revolution).  See Piketty & Saez, supra note 80, at 
2, 24.  
82 TASK FORCE REPORTS, supra note 25.  
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the advantaged roar with a clarity and consistency that policymakers readily hear 
and routinely follow.83 
This undermines the principle of political equality, or what Rawls calls the fair value of the 
political liberties, by allowing socio-economic disadvantage to translate into political 
disadvantage and the erosion of the fair value of one’s political liberties.   
According to some studies, the poorest 1/3 of Americans has virtually no influence on 
national legislation and the bottom 2/3 has less than half the influence of the top 1/3.84 Bartels 
summarized his unpublished findings from the 101st Congress of 1989 to the 103rd Congress of 
1994 to show that while there was a good deal of responsiveness to middle and high income 
constituents, senators completely ignored constituents in the bottom third economic bracket.85 
The figures are stark, with nearly twice as much responsiveness being shown for high income 
constituents than for middle income constituents and absolutely no weight given to the lower 1/3 
of the population.86 One may have expected that this would hold true for Republican members 
of Congress, given the stereotype that Republicans are for the rich while Democrats are for the 
poor.87 Bartels’ statistics do in fact show that Republicans are nearly twice as responsive to the 
 
83 Jacobs & Skocpol, supra note 25, at 27.  See also Kay Lehman Schlozman, On Inequality and Political Voice: 
Response to Stephen Earl Bennett’s Critique, 39 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 55, 56 (2006) (referring to SCHLOZMAN ET.
AL., supra note 45, at 30-33). 
84 Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 40; See also Stephen Macedo & Christopher Karpowitz, The Local Roots 
of Inequality, 39 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. 59, 60 (2006); Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political 
Representation (2005) (hereinafter Bartels, Economic) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Princeton University), 
www.princeton.edu/~bartels/economic.pdf; Martin Gilens, Public Opinion and Democratic Responsiveness: Who 
Gets What they Want from Government? (2003) (hereinafter Gilens, Public Opinion) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with Princeton University), http://www.princeton.edu/~csdp/events/pdfs/Gilens.pdf.  See also Martin Gilens, 
discussing Public Opinion and Democratic Responsiveness: Who Gets What they Want from Government? at The 
Center for Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University, conference on Global Inequality (Nov. 7-8, 2003). 
85 Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 40. 
86 See id. at 40 fig.1. 
87 Although there is some truth to the former assertion, Bartels’ work shows that there is little truth the latter 
assertion.  
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views of wealthy constituents as are Democrats.88 While one might expect that Democrats 
would spread their responsiveness between the middle and lower income constituent, they in fact 
split their responsiveness nearly 50/50 between middle and high income constituents and, like 
Republicans, are completely unresponsive to low income constituents.89 This view is supported 
by historians of voting law and practices and by former democratic cabinet members.  As 
Alexander Keyssar notes in his work on the history of voting in America, Democrats have spent 
more energy courting suburban swing votes and trying to keep Wall Street happy than trying to 
mobilize the masses of poor non-voters.90 
Bartels also noted that the unpublished work of Martin Gilens supported his finding.91 
Gilens has since published his expanded research and the results are even more startling than 
Bartels’ findings.92 Although he found a moderately strong relationship between what the public 
wants and what the government does,93 he also found that when Americans with different income 
levels had differing policy preferences the policy outcomes strongly reflected the preferences of 
the most affluent but not those of poor or even middle-income Americans.94 Thus, Gilens’ 
published work goes much further than questioning whether the democratic system works for the 
poor to whether the system can be characterized as democratic at all.  
 
88 Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 20-24, 44-46 tbls.4-6, 53 fig.3 . 
89 The actual ratio is 54/46, and thus Democrats can boast that they are moderately more the party of the middle 
class than of the upper class.  Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 53 fig.3. 
90 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 4, 321.  Keyssar also refers to the work of Robert Reich, Clinton’s secretary of labor 
(ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE CABINET (1997)) noting that Reich’s memoirs have a number of references to 
the fact that the Clinton administration’s political strategies subordinated social policy to the preferences of Wall 
Street.  KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 4, 321. 
91 Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 40 (referring to Gilens, Public Opinion, supra note 84). 
92 He has almost doubled his data set from 754 to 2000 questions and expanded the years from 1992 to 1998 to 
between 1981 and 2002.  Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB. OPINION Q. 778, 778-
96 (2005) (hereinafter Gilens, Inequality).  Note that these years substantially overlap with the Rehnquist Court and 
with the beginning of regressive tort reform. 
93 He notes, however, that even with proposed changes receiving 90% public support there is only a 46% chance the 
policy makers will adopt the policy.  Gilens, Inequality, supra note 92, at 786 
94 See Gilens, Inequality, supra note 92, at 788-789. 
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Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page found similar results when it came to U.S. foreign 
relations. 95 These authors tested the impact of four different factors on U.S. foreign policy 
(public opinion, labor, members of epistemic communities (educators and leaders of private 
foreign policy organizations and think tanks [hereinafter experts]), and business).96 They used 
four different types of regression models and found that under the four models, business was by 
far the most dominant influence on U.S. foreign policy (across the House, the Senate and the 
executive/administration).97 Public opinion had virtually no impact,98 and the impact of experts 
was dubious.99 It was unclear whether their opinions were causes or effects of the views of 
policy makers,100 and how much of their views was the product of the influence of business and 
labor.101 If the impact of business and labor, on expert opinions is plugged into their analysis, 
the impact of business on foreign policy raises from .52 to just over .70 while the impact of labor 
raises from .16 to about .29.102 While labor has some impact, it is still dwarfed by the impact of 
business.   
The results of this study again bring into question democratic responsiveness and 
accountability.103 If public opinion has little to no influence on foreign policy, the real impact of 
experts is dubious and business has two to three times the impact of labor, then one must 
question the true vitality of American democracy.  Given the standards articulated above, these 
 
95 Lawrence R. Jacobs & Benjamin I. Page, Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 107 
(2005). 
96 Id. at 110. 
97 Id. at 114-117. 
98 Id. at 114 tbl.1, 115 tbls.2-3, 116 tbl.4. 
99 Id. at 117, 114 tbl.1, 115 tbls.2-3, 116 tbl.4. 
100 Id. at 117.   
101 Id. at 119.  
102 Id. at 119; see id. at 120 tbl.5.  For a treatment of this phenomenon in the context of tort reform see FEINMAN,
supra note 9, at 175. 
103 The authors note that their finding may have troubling normative implications for “adherents to democratic 
theory who advocate substantial government responsiveness to the reasoned preferences of citizens.”  Id. at 121 
(referring to such adherents as ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) and BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT 
SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF TRENDS IN AMERICA’S POLICY PREFERENCES (1992). 
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signs of non-responsiveness and grossly unequal responsiveness threaten democracy conceived 
in these terms.104 
Of course, it is difficult to be heard if one does not have a voice.  Political voice is 
exercised through voting, spending or contributing, and actual contact with politicians.  Social 
scientists have identified voter turnout as the potential cause of both the failure to alleviate the 
inequality gap105 and the failure to respond to lower income constituencies.106 Others have 
argued that affluence and actual contact with politicians or the lack thereof may be more 
significant in determining the responsiveness of politicians to different constituencies.107 
According to Kenworthy and Pontusson, the median-voter model predicts that with 
increases in market inequality the distance between median and mean income increases (the 
mean or average wage goes up more than the wage in the middle, or median wage) and as a 
result, support for government spending increases and thus the inequality gap is narrowed.108 As 
documented above, while the model works in Europe, it has failed in the U.S.  How does one 
account for the failure?  One viable explanation for the why Europe does and the U.S. do not 
close the gap is voter turnout.  In the countries surveyed by Kenworthy and Pontusson the 
differences in responsiveness to inequalities roughly track voter turnout rates.109 In other words, 
the higher the voter turnout, the more redistribution from rich to poor.110 
A. Voter turnout: the most egalitarian form of political participation 
 
104 Bartels, Water Rising, supra note 56, at 39.  
105 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 456-461, 459 (emphasis added), 462 fig.9.  This is the contemporary 
variant of Kuznet’s work cited above.  Kuznet, supra note 78. 
106 John Griffin & Brian Newman, Are Voters Better Represented, 67 J. POL. 1206 (2005). 
107 Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 26-27.  
108 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 456 (referring to Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard, A Rational Theory of 
the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914 (1981)). 
109 Kenworthy & Pontusson, supra note 63, at 459, 462 fig.9. 
110 Compare table 2, infra at ___ and table 3, infra at __.  The explanation is strengthened in the U.S. case by the 
data presented below, which shows that the poor have much lower voter turnout rates than those in the middle class 
and above. 
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The average voter turnout for elections in the 16 countries in the Appendix Table 4 is 
about 76%.111 Although the 2004 U.S. national elections saw a somewhat respectable turnout of 
almost 60%, that number was unusually high for U.S national elections.112 The average turnout 
for U.S. congressional elections from 1945 to 2001 was 48%, which is quite low compared to the 
average.  The turnout at local elections tends to hover at about 30% and below.113 Statistics 
collected by Michael P. McDonald from state elections from 1980-2004 show voter participation 
rates from between 47% and 50%.114 Even if state officials are responsive to voters, these 
numbers call into question the democratic pedigree of state legislative tort reform. 
Writing prior to the 2000 elections, Alexander Keyssar noted that historically, low voter 
turnout correlated with class and education and that “the people who are least likely to be content 
and complacent (and most likely to need government help) are those who are least likely to 
vote.”115 This debunks the idea that Americans don’t vote because they are generally content.  
He goes on to state that low voter turnout persists among the same groups to whom the franchise 
was limited throughout much of American history, namely, the poor, the young, certain 
minorities and those with less education—i.e. the ‘have-nots.’116 
111 Derived from statistics of averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in parliamentary elections 
from 1945-2001 compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance.  RAFAEL LÓPEZ 
PINTOR ET AL., VOTER TURNOUT RATES FROM A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 75, 83-84 (2002), 
http://www.idea.int/publications/vt/upload/Voter%20turnout.pdf.  Note that not only is the U.S. significantly below 
every other country on this list, it ranks 139th out the 169 countries in the survey.  Id. 
112 The U.S. census report puts the number higher because it excludes those people of voting age who are not 
eligible to vote like certain immigrants and felons/ ex felons.  KELLY HOLDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND 
REGISTRATION IN THE NOVEMBER 2004 ELECTION: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2006), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p20-556.pdf.  
113 Macedo & Karpowitz, supra note 84, at 59-60 (referring to STEPHEN MACEDO ET. AL., DEMOCRACY AT RISK:
HOW POLITICAL CHOICES UNDERMINE CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 66 (2005) and 
Zoltan Hajnal & Jessica Trounstine, Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven turnout in City Politics,
67 J. POL. 515 (2005), as well as others). 
114 United States Election Project, Voter Turnout Statistics, Turnout 1980-2006, 
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout%201980-2006.xls (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).  See also Michael P. McDonald, 
State Turnout Rates Among Those Eligible to Vote, 1980-2000, 2 ST. POL. AND POL’Y Q. 1999 (2002).   
115 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 321. 
116 Id. The notable exception is women.  HOLDER, supra note 112, at 2.
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These observations were borne out in the 2004 elections.  Those in the over $50,000 
income bracket had a 77% voter turnout as opposed to those making less than $20,000, who had 
a 48% voter turnout.117 The poor were greatly overrepresented among non-voters while those 
making over $100,000 a year are greatly underrepresented among non-voters. 118 The employed 
had a 66% turnout as opposed to a 50% turnout for the unemployed.119 Those with Bachelor’s 
degrees had about twice the voter turnout as those without high school degrees (78% vs. 40%).120 
Those in the 18-24 year old bracket who do not have a high school degree had a rate of fewer 
than 25% while those in the same bracket with college degrees had a 67% rate.121 Non-Hispanic 
white citizens had turnout rates at 67% while black citizens were at 60%, Hispanic citizens at 
47% and Asian citizens at 44%.122 
As one might predict, the increase in voter turnout for the 2004 election was not due to 
higher turnout rate from Blacks, Asians, Hispanics or from the poor, but from non-Hispanic 
whites who increased their turnout from 60.5% in 2000 to 67% in 2004, and those making over 
$50,000 per year who increased their turnout from 72% in 2000 to 77% in 2004.123 
As noted above, voter turnout has also been used to explain the closely related 
phenomenon of a lack of responsiveness.  Griffin and Newman found that voters are better 
represented than non-voters.124 Given that the middle and upper income groups have better voter 
 
117 HOLDER, supra note 112, at 5.  The income based statistics stop at $100,000 and over and so it is difficult to 
know what the numbers are like for the very wealthy. 
118 Id. at 10 tbl.C. 
119 Id. at 5. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 6. 
122 Id. at 7.  
123 Compare HOLDER, supra note 112 with AMY JAMIESON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND 
REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2000: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 3, 5 (2002), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p20-542.pdf.  
124 Griffin & Newman, supra note 106. 
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turnout rates than the poor, this may account for at least some of the difference in 
responsiveness.  
There is a whole host of explanations for why certain minorities, the poor, and 
uneducated have such low voter turnouts.  Those explanations include: 
• lack of stake in the system (little to gain), 125 
• the complex non-user-friendly procedures,126 
• conflicts with work, school or childcare obligations,127 
• the fact that voting is not mandatory,128 and   
• the fact that the U.S. has a two party system, under which neither party caters to the 
interests of the poor.129 
Almost all of these factors have a disproportionate negative impact on the poor and 
uneducated.  If elected officials were concerned about the groups that have such low voter 
turnout, a number of simple reforms would make it easier to go to the polls.  As common sense 
suggests, given that those who do not vote did not elect the people currently in office, there is not 
much incentive for those in office to enact reforms to bring them to the polls.130 
125 Clinton’s own secretary of labor said that “the great mass of non-voters . . . . didn’t vote in 1996 because they 
saw nothing in it for them.”  REICH, supra note 90, at 330. 
126 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 321; see also MARTIN WATTENBERG, WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE? 162 
(2002).  Wattenberg finds it impressive how good our turnout is given how complicated our process is compared to 
other countries.  Id. 
127 This is because our elections are held during the work week and not on a public holiday.  See WATTENBERG,
supra note 126, at 169-71.  Wattenberg notes that in President Clinton’s last official message to Congress he wrote, 
“We should declare election day a national holiday so that no one has to choose between their responsibilities at 
work and their responsibilities as a citizen.”  Id. at 170-71 (citing William Jefferson Clinton, 42nd President of the 
United States, The Unfinished Work of Building One America, Message to Congress (Jan. 15, 2001)). 
128 In the 9 countries where compulsory voting is enforced, the turnout rate is over 85% compared to nearly 75% in 
the 10 states that do not enforce their mandatory voting laws.  Compare this to the average of approximately 68% for 
the remaining 147 states that do not have compulsory voting.  PINTOR ET AL., supra note 111. 
129 KEYSSAR, supra note 11, at 321.  As he further notes, Clinton’s own secretary of labor said that “the great mass 
of non-voters … didn’t vote in 1996 because they saw nothing in it for them.”  Id. See also REICH, supra note 90, at 
330. 
130 Here, the democratic process has very little hope of correcting itself.  
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Setting aside the problems created by the two party system,131 which would be both 
practically and politically difficult to change, many other changes would be simple, for instance:  
• making ballots less complicated,132 
• making elections mandatory,133 
• making election day a national holiday,134 
• putting it on a weekend,135 or  
• simply extending the hours.136 
These would significantly improve democratic participation.  
B.  Other more stratified forms of political participation 
 Bartels tested the hypothesis that voter turnout was the cause of lack of responsiveness 
along with a few other contenders, e.g., “political knowledge” and “contact with senators and/or 
staff” and found the latter (contact with senators and/or staff) to have the most significant impact 
on responsiveness.137 By comparing his work with Sidney Verba’s, he was also able to roughly 
test the hypothesis that campaign contributions impacted on responsiveness, and found that in 
two of the eight issue areas the projected disparities in responsiveness matched the disparities in 
 
131 See e.g. AREND LIJPHART, PATTERS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX 
DEMOCRACIES (1999); see also Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed 
Systems, 18 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 297 (1997) (Special issue: Contrasting Political Institutions), available at 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Dem09.pdf. 
132 Wattenberg notes that in Europe there are generally much fewer choices to make on ballots, making them much 
easier to complete.  WATTENBERG, supra note 126, at 166.  
133 See PINTOR ET AL., supra note 111; see also WATTENBERG, supra note 126, at 164; and Arend Lijphart, Unequal 
Participation: Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1997).  Note that compulsory voting 
laws do not require that one actually vote, but they do require that one show up to vote unless one has an appropriate 
excuse or justification for not doing so.  WATTENBERG, supra note 126, at 164. 
134 WATTENBERG, supra note 126, at 170-71. 
135 Id. at 169. 
136 Id. at 172 (drawing on the Japanese experience). 
137 Bartels, Economic, supra note 84, at 24-29, 47 tbl.7. 
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income contribution while in the others, the disparities did not quite match the dollar for dollar 
disparities although, unsurprisingly, they did tend in the same direction.138 
Despite low voter turnout rates, voters are the most numerous and most representative 
group of political activists.139 At the other end of the representative spectrum are campaign 
contributors, who are the least representative.140 Eighty five percent of those making a donation 
to a presidential candidate of over $1,000 had at least a BA, and 95% of the substantial donors to 
presidential candidates in 2000 made over $100,000.141 The race, sex and age discrepancies in 
donations of over $200 to presidential candidates reflect similar discrepancies, with 96% of 
donations coming from Whites, 70% coming from males and over 99% of donations coming 
from those over 30.  Those in the 18-30 bracket contributed only 1% while those over age 46 
contributed 83%.142 
Looking across the spectrum of participation, the statistics show that those making over 
$75,000 per year are between two and six times more likely to participate in politics through 
campaign work, direct contact, protests, affiliation with political organizations, informal 
community activities, and campaign contributions than those making under $75,000 per year.143 
Those making over $75,000 per year have approximately twice as much direct contact as those 
making under $75,000 per year.  The numbers are not as drastic for race, but they do show 
 
138 Id. at 28-29 (using SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND INEQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
194, 565 (1995)  
139 SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 22, 38 tbl.3.  
140 Id. at 22. 
141 Id. at 22.  This group comprised only 12% of the population. Id. 
142 Id. at 38 tbl.3. 
143 Id. at 23 fig.1.  Class based stratification affects the entire range of political activities.  KEYSSAR, supra note 11, 
at 321-322 (referring to VERBA, ET AL., supra note 148, at 1-13, 23-24, 511-33).  “The affluent and well-educated 
are not only able to afford the financial costs of organizational support but they are in a better position to command 
the skills, acquire the information, and utilize connections that are helpful in getting an organization off the ground 
or keeping it going.”  SCHLOZMAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 20. 
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significant disparities between Whites, African Americans and Latinos.144 The discrepancy in 
political activity between those in the 18-24 age range and those in the ranges of 24-49 and 50-
59 was about 1-2.145 Note that the E. U., Council of Europe and the E.U. Ministers of Youth 
have expended considerable efforts to get youth below voting age to participate in politics, 
through direct integrations into the political processes, youth organizations, action oriented 
participation and through ombudsman representing the interests of children. 146 
Education, is a central element in the relationship between socio-economic status and 
participation because it affects many other determinants of socio-economic status as well as the 
other determinants of participation, e.g., job, income, knowledge, civic and organizational skills, 
as well as connections with other politically active people who are more likely to enlist their aid 
in political activities.147 
Given the growing inequality in America, the low voter turnout among the poor and 
uneducated, the lack of access of middle and lower income Americans to politicians, and the 
resulting lack of influence on “representatives” it is not surprising that legislation in general, and 
 
144 Gilens, Inequality, supra note 92, at 24 tbl.2.  See also id. at 24 fig.3.  In terms of mean number of political 
activities Anglo-White men had 2.36 compared to 1.94 for Black men and 1.61 for Latino men.  Among women, 
Whites had 2.08, Black’s 1.86, and Latinas .9.  Id. 
145 Id. at 25 fig.4.  It shows 1.26 political acts performed by those in the 18-24 age range compared with 2.17 in the 
30-39 range, 2.54 in the 40-49 range, 2.52 in the 50-59 range, 2.35 for 60-69, with the numbers understandably 
dropping off for those over 70 to 1.82.  
146 See, e.g., European Commission, Political Participation Starts at School,  
http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2006/pr2003en.cfm (last visited Jan. 18, 2007);  See also EUROPAISCHES 
ZENTRUM, THE EUROPEAN CENTER FOR SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY & RESEARCH, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF 
YOUTH: A REMEDY AGAINST MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION,
http://www.icnyp.net/www/files/political_participation_of_youth.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). 
147 Gilens, Inequality, supra note 92, at 26.  Access to selective colleges is highly skewed by race and ethnicity, and 
even more skewed by socio-economic status.  ANTHONY P. CARNEVALE & STEPHEN J. ROSE, CENTURY 
FOUNDATION, SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS, RACE/ETHNICITY, AND SELECTIVE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 10-11, 69 tbl.1.1 
(2003), available at http://www.tcf.org/Publications/Education/carnevale_rose.pdf.  Carnevale and Rose found that 
“74 percent of the students at the top 146 highly selective colleges came from families in the top quarter of the SES 
scale (as measured by combining family income and the education and occupations of the parents), just 3 percent 
came from the bottom SES quartile, and roughly 10 percent came from the bottom half of the SES scale.  If 
attendance at these institutions reflected the population at large, 85,000 students (rather than 17,000) would have 
been from the bottom two SES quartiles.”  Id. at 11. 
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tort reform in particular, would not tend to the needs and preferences of a majority of Americans 
but would cater to the preferences of the few. 
C.  Disenfranchised citizens (Illegal Americans)148 
Since 1975, incarceration rates in the United States have quadrupled and over 5.3 million 
felons and ex felons are prohibited from voting.149 Two and a half percent of the general 
population is denied the vote.150 The demographics for the prison population significantly 
overlap with those in society who have low voter turnout and low political participation in 
general.  Richard Freeman of Harvard University and the National Bureau of Economic Research 
reports that the prison population is disproportionately black and young with low education and 
literacy levels.151 Information on released prisoners indicates that 14% have less than 8 years of 
schooling and 67% have less than high school.152 Nearly half of the prison population consists 
of black males and 68% of all prisoners are below the age of 34.153 
148 The term “illegal American” is used because it tracks the pejorative term “illegal immigrant.”  It is a way 
marking them as “illegal” rather than as, say, hard working exploited immigrants.  The label “illegal” is not 
generally used to categorize people when they break the law.  For instance, there is little talk about the “illegal 
employer” problem in America.  Felony disenfranchisement, particular post-release, is a way of marking people as 
outlaws or second class citizens.  
149 Manza and Uggen put the number at 5.3 million with 39% having completed their sentences.  JEFF MANZA &
CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 77 (2006).  See 
also KATHERINE I. PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL ORIGINS, INSTITUTIONAL 
RACISM, AND MODERN CONSEQUENCES (2005).  As of June 2005, there were 4.8 people incarcerated out of every 
1,000, which is almost one out of very 200 people.  U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prison 
Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).  The percentages for Black males at 
the end of 2004 was over 3% compared to white males at less than .05% of their population.  Id. 
150 LALEH ISPAHANI, ACLU, OUT OF STEP WITH THE WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN 
THE U.S. AND OTHER DEMOCRACIES 3 (2006), http://www.aclu.org/images/asset_upload_file825_25663.pdf. 
151 RICHARD FREEMAN, CAN WE CLOSE THE REVOLVING DOOR? RECIDIVISM VS. EMPLOYMENT OF EX-OFFENDERS IN 
THE U.S.A. (The Urban Inst. Reentry Roundtable Discussion Paper No. 2 2003), available at 
http://www.ssw.umich.edu/events/CASD/freeman.pdf. 
152 Id. at 7 tbl.3. 
153 Id. at 15 tbl.1.  
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Ex offenders do not do well in the job market.  They have low employment rates and they 
tend to earn less than others with similar demographics.154 Further, nearly one third has a 
physical impairment or mental condition and 21% have some physical or mental condition that 
impairs work ability.155 As Freeman states, “Since persons with physical and mental health 
problems, limited education, and poor literacy do badly in the US job market independently of a 
criminal record, [it should come as no surprise that] ex-offenders fare poorly in the job 
market.”156 It should also come as little surprise that under these conditions, most prisoners end 
up back in prison.157 
The felon/ex-felon is a distinct, insular and growing minority in American society.  
Although they represent an extreme case, their disenfranchisement is compounded by the fact 
that they have very little mobility, very little stake, and even less say in the future of American 
society.158 
Looking at the phenomenon comparatively, the U.S. incarcerates between five and eight 
times the number of people incarcerated in other advanced industrial nations.159 The 
overwhelming majority of Western European states have no ban on voting at all,160 or only ban 
voting for specific criminals who commit certain serious crimes, and usually as explicit 
 
154 Id. at 9-10 (referring to Richard Freeman, Economics of Crime, in THE HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS Ch. 52 
(Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999)); Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and 
Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 477 (2002). 
155 Id. at 10, 11 tbl.5. 
156 Id. at 13. 
157 Id. at 2 (citing PATRICK LANGAN & DAVID LEVIN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS 
RELEASED IN 1994 1 (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf)).  
158 This is also true of the over 10 million unauthorized immigrant living in the U.S.  For the numbers see JEFFREY S. 
PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2005), 
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf.  Unauthorized immigrants provide a cheap, hard working and docile 
labor force.  Their presence keeps authorized immigrants and U.S. citizens relatively docile while keeping their 
wages low.  They also provide a scapegoat for our woes and threats to our security, even though they put much more 
into our economy than they take out (including social security and taxes) and there have been few if any terrorists 
threats coming from unauthorized immigrants, especially from Mexico.  The nineteen 9/11 terrorists entered the 
country legally.  9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 27 (2004).   
159 ISPAHANI, supra note 150, at 6. 
160 Seventeen European states do not ban voting at all, nine of which are Western European states.  Id. 
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additional aspects of their prison sentence.161 While some twelve European states completely 
ban voting for incarcerated prisoners,162 ten of these twelve states are former Eastern Bloc 
countries who have a history of limited enfranchisement.163 Of the two Western European 
countries, Spain and the United Kingdom, Spain rarely disenfranchises its prisoners,164 and the 
practice of blanket bans in the United Kingdom has recently been condemned by the European 
Court of Human Rights in Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2).165 Further, while some countries 
disqualify ex-felons from voting, “the sanction is purposefully and narrowly targeted, and the 
number of disenfranchised people is probably in the dozens or hundreds.  In the United States, 
the disqualification is automatic, pursues no defined purpose and affects millions.”166 
Not only has the European Court of Human Rights condemned practices like that in the 
U.S., but so have the Supreme Court of Israel,167 the Supreme Court of Canada,168 and the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa.169 These countries recognize that denying prisoners the 
right to vote is not undesirable merely because it harms the individual who loses the right, but 
 
161 Id. at 7.  Eleven states fall in this category, with eight of them coming from Western Europe (Greece is counted 
in this tradition).  
162 Id. at 8.  
163 Id. at 8. 
164 Id. 
165 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No 2), 681 Eur Ct. H.R. (2005) (discussing a U.K. law denying the vote to all 
prisoners, stating “Such a general, automatic, and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right 
must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide the margin might be, and is 
incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.”); ISPAHANI, supra note 150, at 8. 
166 ISPAHANI, supra note 150, at 6. 
167 Hilla Alrai v Minister of Interior HC2757/06 P.D. 50(2) 18 (1996) (refusing to disenfranchise Yigal Amir, the 
individual convicted of assassinating Yitzak Rabin, the Israeli Prime Minister.  “[W]ithout the right to elect, the 
foundation of all other rights is undermined . . . . Accordingly every society should take great care not to interfere 
with the right to elect except in extreme circumstances.”). 
168 Sauvé v. Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (striking down a law which denied the right to vote to those serving more 
than two years “Denying the vote denies the basis of democratic legitimacy . . . . if we accept that governmental 
power  in a democracy flows from the citizens, it is difficult to see how that power can legitimately be used to 
disenfranchise the very citizens from whom the government’s power flows.”  Id. at para 32).  
169 National Institute of Crime Prevention and the Re-Integration of Offenders (NICRO), Erasmus and Schwagerl v. 
Minister of Home Affairs (CCT 03/04 2004) (striking down the Electoral Laws Amended Act 34 of 2003, which 
denied the right to vote for those serving prison sentences that did not have the option of a fine); August and 
Another v Electoral Commission and Others (CCT 8/99 1999) (holding that the Electoral Commission, by not 
providing the means and mechanisms for prisoners to vote, had breached the prisoner’s rights to vote under the 
Constitution). 
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because it harms the democratic legitimacy of the state.  As McLachlin CJ, writing for the 
majority in Sauvé v. Canada said: 
 
The right of all citizens to vote, regardless of virtue or mental ability or other 
distinguishing features underpins the legitimacy of Canadian democracy and 
Parliament’s claim to power.  A government that restricts the franchise to a select 
portion of citizens is a government that weakens its ability to function as the 
legitimate representative of the excluded citizens, jeopardizes its claims to 
representative democracy, and erodes the basis of its right to convict and punish 
lawbreakers.170 
Denying prisoners the right to vote, particularly after they have served their time is a 
throw-back to pre-democratic times, when “democracy” was reserved for certain classes of 
people.  The current trend sends the message that prisoners, and even ex-prisoners, are no longer 
a part of the same “democratic” America.  This is particularly troubling given that this class is 
greatly overrepresented by minorities, those who are economically disadvantaged, educationally 
deprived and who have mental and physical disabilities.  Taking away this right sends the 
message that these people are second class citizens, in effect, “illegal Americans.”  
IV. THE TORT REVOLUTION AND COUNTER-REVOLUTION  
The current wave of tort reform has been variously referred to as “tort deform,” “tort 
retrenchment,” “corporate cost shifting” or “corporate welfare.”  While some would like to 
depict the recent trend in tort law as a semi-autonomous development in the law to meet the 
 
170 Sauvé v. Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para 34. 
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needs of the day, this is not an accurate view.  The current wave of tort “reform” is tied to a 
systematic and coordinated campaign,171 “by an army of corporations, foundations, lobbyists, 
litigation centers, think tanks politicians and academics,”172 to unmake or undo developments 
over the last 100 years across the common law.173 This wave has its roots in a comprehensive 
view of the role of government in society that was in its heyday over 100 years ago, namely the 
laissez-faire view.174 The idea is a return to a time of minimal government interference with 
capitalists and their market and a return to pre-modern or classical legal thought under which 
judges are mere neutral referees, rather than guardians of justice.  Here, individual negative 
rights embodying such notions as “freedom of contract” and “buyer beware” trump public 
policy, embodying ideas such as “corporate responsibility” and “consumer safety,” and the idea 
that government sometimes needs to intervene to ensure that people actually are free.  As pointed 
out above, this is a return to Lochner era values. 175 It is worth remembering that the Lochner era 
came to an end, in part, because of democratic developments and the realization that unchecked 
private power in the hands of the few could be just as large a threat to the actual freedom and 
equality of the people as unchecked public power.  
 
171 FEINMAN, supra note 9.  According to Feinman, Federalist Society members boasted that they occupied all of the 
assistant attorneys general positions and more than half of all other political appointments within the Regan-Meese 
Justice Department.  Further, one fourth of all federal judicial candidates under the second Bush administration were 
recommended by the Federalist society and most of the lawyers in the White House Counsel’s office have been 
active members. Id. at 189. 
172 Id. at 189. 
173 Jay Feinman traces this campaign all the way back to Ronald Regan’s inaugural address, where he stated that 
“Government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem.”  FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 1. The 
tort reform campaign came together in the Tort Policy Working Group within the Reagan-Meese justice department. 
Id. at 186 (citing the TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE 
CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND 
AFFORDABILITY (1986)).  See also Dawn Johnson, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional 
Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. J. 363 (2003).  For a comprehensive database 
on state tort reform totaling over 1,000 pages see RONEN AVRAHAM, DATABASE OF STATE TORT LAW REFORMS 
(2006) (Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 902711), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902711. 
174 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 172 (citing JOHN B. JUDIS & TUY TEIXEIRA, THE EMERGING DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY 
151-52 (2002)).   
175 Id. at 3-5, 7-18.  Compare with Law, supra note 30 (making similar comments regarding the Rehnquist Court). 
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A common critique of the recent “tort reform campaign” is that it is based on 
misinformation, if not lies.176 As Feinman states, “The problem with the conservative campaign, 
however, is that it is false.  Not debatable, or a matter of opinion or political viewpoint, but 
false.”177 Its falsity is based in many little lies that exaggerate cases, overstate the amount of and 
the effect of frivolous lawsuits, the impact of regulations on property rights and as well as the 
impact of liberal adjudication on the sanctity of contract.178 When combined they feed into the 
big lie that the common law has been hijacked by greedy plaintiffs and lawyers as well as by 
liberal activist judges.179 
The tort reform campaign has been largely advanced by large corporate interests, who, as 
shown above, have the means necessary to make their voices heard.180 They often use mass 
media as a vehicle for spreading their ideas.181 Most of these “tort reform” advocates have little 
reason beyond their own self interest in endorsing the tort reform agenda.182 These so-called 
reformers have the “singular purpose of furthering their political agenda by enraging the public 
over a civil justice system supposedly gone awry.”183 Corporations have portrayed themselves as 
blameless victims, while portraying individuals (and their lawyers) as the aggressors.184 They 
accomplish this by distorting the facts and turning “bizarre cases that almost happened into a 
 
176 See Lind, supra note 37, at 719; Abel, supra note 37, at 556; Goldberg, supra note 15; Priest, supra note 37, at 
683; Eaton, supra note 37; Witt, supra note 37; Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends about 
the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 721 (1998) (hereinafter Galanter, Oil Strike).  
177 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 190. 
178 Id. at 191. 
179 Id. at 191.
180 See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 40, at 8 ; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21; Robert S. Peck et al., Tort 
Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397 (2000); Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 
176.  For example, one estimate states that in 1999 the insurance industry alone spent 85.6 million for lobbying.  
HALTOM & MCCANN, supra, at 48.   
181 See HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 40, at 8; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 51. 
182 Peck et al., supra note 1, at 398. 
183 Id.  
184 Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 176, at 733 (1998); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 4. 
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report of something typical and prevalent.”185 As Haltom and McCann note, there are generally 
four characteristics of “tort tales” that “tort reformers” tell:  
• elegance (they communicate moral messages that are instantly understandable);186 
• stereotypic characterization (plaintiffs are blameworthy, defendants are not);  
• holler of the dollar (plaintiffs are always greedy); and,  
• extraordinary occurrences symbolize ordinary outcomes (as if they were normal 
occurrences).187 
These types of unfounded claims are typical of the ammunition that tort reformers use.188 For 
example, while tort reformers “claim” that punitive damages are out of control,189 studies have 
shown that they are only awarded in about six percent of the cases that plaintiffs win.190 
Given the data and arguments put forth above in Parts II-III, one does not need to be a 
conspiracy theorist to predict that a well organized and funded campaign to institute reform for 
the “haves” by the “haves” in the area of tort law would be successful even if it was not good for 
the majority of Americans.  The pervasive disinformation that accompanies this movement has 
no doubt acted like grease on a pig for those fighting against these “reforms” while acting like 
grease on the cogs of the machine for those pushing the reforms. This undermines the democratic 
 
185 Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 176, at 728.  For example, Galanter refers to a case where a woman claimed she 
lost her psychic abilities due to a CAT scan and a million dollar verdict was given but later thrown out.  Id. at 726-
27.  Rustad and Koenig refer to the McDonald’s case where the fact that the coffee spilt was a 180 degrees, caused 
third degree burns and the plaintiff needed skin grafts is often left out of the story.  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, 
at 719.  Further, it is seldom reported that the 2.9 million dollar verdict against McDonald’s was reduced to 480,000.  
Id.  Feinman refers to a case where a man sued the dairy industry and Safeway stores claiming that drinking milk 
increased his risk of stroke.  FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 24.  In reality, however, the claim was dismissed.  Id. 
186 As Marc Galanter put’s it, “The jaundiced view resonates with cultural themes of individualism and self-reliance 
and has a strong nostalgic component.”  Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 176, at 720.  
187 HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 40, at 62-63.  For an interesting example of this strategy see American Tort 
Reform Association, Looney Lawsuits, http://www.atra.org/display/13 (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).  Also, in 1995 the 
ATRA received half of its budget from tobacco companies.  HALTOM & MCCANN, supra, at 46. 
188 Further, tort reformers consistently ignore positive aspects of the tort system, such as deterrence.  See Marc 
Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 90 (1993) (hereinafter 
Galanter, Nowhere). 
189 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 69. 
190 Id. See also infra note 269 for other low estimates on the award of punitive damages. 
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principle that political choices be the result of deliberation among political equals. Distorted 
deliberations make it nearly impossible for people to give voice to their interests or preferences 
since the disinformation often results in people thinking they want choice A when they really 
would prefer choice B if they knew all the facts.  Although there have been countless studies 
refuting most of the key assertions used to justify the “tort reform” movement, the jaundiced 
view of the American civil justice system portrayed by this movement system still flourishes, 
and, no doubt, it does so because these “tort tales” are cast as legends that resonate with the basic 
themes of individual responsibility and self reliance which are so core to American political and 
legal culture.191 The result is a perverse form of corporate welfare where companies are able to 
shift responsibility for their conduct off of their shoulders and onto the shoulders of individual 
consumers. 
The remainder of this article will first briefly canvass both the main achievements in 
democratic tort reform as well as the recent retrenchment of some of those achievements along 
with other regressive changes in tort law.  It will then look at the role of the Supreme Court in 
tort reform to show the unprecedented extent to which that institution has engaged in an area 
generally considered the domain of the states, their courts and Congress, to the detriment of the 
people and of democracy.  As will be shown, as American democracy goes, so goes tort reform. 
Before beginning the exploration of tort reform it might be wise to respond to a 
preliminary objection. One may argue that since the bulk of progressive tort reform during the 
60s and 70s was judicially created and most of the tort reform since the 1980s is legislative, the 
latter trend of regressive tort reform must have a better democratic pedigree than the former.  
 
191 Galanter, Oil Strike, supra note 176, at 721.  As Kevin O’Leary notes in KEVIN O’LEARY, SAVING DEMOCRACY 
(2006), democratic theorists as diverse as Jon Elster, Jurgen Habermas and John Rawl’s all hold the view that 
“political choice, to be legitimate, must be the outcome of deliberation about ends among free and equal rational 
agents.”  O’LEARY, supra, at 163 (quoting Jon Elster, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 5 (Jon Elster ed., 
1998)).   
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This is dubious for at least two reasons.  First, it is by no means settled that the bulk of 
progressive tort reform in the former period was judicial (see Part IV.A. below).  More 
importantly, given the evidence above that America’s traditional “democratic” institutions (the 
executive and legislative branches) are skewed, or corrupted from the perspective of democratic 
values, then it follows that courts, which are generally insulated from interest group power 
politics and which are required to justify their decisions to the public through written decisions, 
may have a better chance of delivering decisions that are democratically justifiable.  This is 
particularly true in the area of personal injury tort law where by and large the plaintiff class is 
unorganized and under funded, and the defendant class is well organized and well funded.192 
Potential victims have neither the motive nor the easy means for organizing.  Most people do not 
think of themselves as potential plaintiffs and thus are not generally mobilized to press their 
concerns, while most businesses and their associations do factor in the potential of being a 
defendant and thus, they have both the motive and the means to press their interests in tort 
reform through experts, lobbying, and campaign contributions.193 Abel also notes that the 
plaintiff’s bar does not necessarily have the interests of plaintiffs in mind in its battle with the 
defense bar over tort reform, for instance when it comes to no-fault automobile compensation 
schemes. 194 
One way around the lack of influence in the judicial sphere is by contracting out of court 
and into arbitration where businesses, particularly businesses that are repeat players, have a 
distinct advantage.195 The other tactic is try to break down the barriers that insulate courts as 
 
192 Of course this is not true of business to business torts, but business to business torts are largely unaffected by tort 
reform.  Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1080-85.   
193 See Abel, supra note 37, at 536-37. 
194 Id. at 537.    
195 See Part IV.B.4 infra for the Supreme Court’s support of this move; See also Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the 
Justice System from ADR as Idealistic Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 927 (2002). 
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much as possible, and this takes place in part through concerted efforts to get pro-tort reform 
judges elected and appointed.  For instance, the movement to dismantle strict liability in products 
cases in California came after 1986 when three liberal judges were voted off the bench and 
replaced with conservatives.196 The politicization of the judiciary took off under former 
President Reagan and continues to thrive today.197 As David Law notes “commentators have 
singled out Reagan for taking the politicization of the judiciary to new heights by implementing 
a centralized high-level process for the ideological vetting of judicial candidates.”198 According 
to Goldman, Reagan was very successful in appointing circuit court justices that remained 
faithful to his conservative agenda.199  This has been reinforced ever since by the active 
participation of conservative groups in the process of judicial nominations.200 
A.  Tort Reform in General 
1.  Progressive democratic tort reform 
The earliest sign of democracy reinforcing reform of tort law began in the early 1900s 
when workmen’s compensation schemes started to spread.  The schemes attempted to find 
 
196 Stephan D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California Experience with ‘New’ Torts, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999). 
197 Note the early department of justice reports under Reagan.  OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE YEAR 2000: CHOICES AHEAD IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION iii (1988), 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/acs/conference/meese-memos/year2000.pdf (focusing on 15 key areas of constitutional 
controversy likely to go before the Court between 1988 and 2000, “the resolution of which is likely to be sharply 
influenced by the judicial philosophies of the individual justices who sit on the Court.”). 
198 David Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 479, 485-86 (2005) (referring to Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Judicial Selection in the New Millennium, 
Prologue, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 587, 589-90 (2003); and Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection As War, 36 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 667, 678 (2003) (remarking upon Reagan's reputation for attending to the ideology of his judicial 
nominees)). 
199 SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN 
116, 307 (1997). 
200 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 189.  See also Nina Totenberg, Conservative Groups Push for More Judicial 
Confirmations, NPR, June 28, 2006, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5517409 
(Conservative groups are urging President Bush and Senate Republicans to push harder to get more of the 
president's judicial nominees approved.  Social conservatives wanted more confirmations before the November 
elections in case the GOP loses Senate seats.). 
44
collective justice for workers who were severely disadvantaged by the extant rules of the tort 
system.201 However, other than workmen’s compensation and Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co., not much reform took place until the “Democratic Expansionary Era" after 
the Second World War.202 
This period saw the court moving from a view of the tort system as providing case by 
case corrective justice to a view of the system as a mechanism for collective justice, or providing 
justice across classes of cases.203 This is partially what allowed the courts to think not only of 
putting people back into the place they were before the tort, but of other social goals like 
deterring wrongs and providing incentives for manufacturers to make their products safer for 
society.204 Courts stopped merely accepting that the status quo distributions of power and wealth 
were just and began tailoring corrective justice to collective and distributive justice concerns.  
Democratic developments during the era resulted in the removal of immunity at both the 
federal level and the state level.205 It began with the Federal Tort Claims Act 1946 28 U.S. § 
2875 and most states followed with similar legislation opening up their court for suits, thereby, 
 
201 The extant rules included such defenses as the fellow servant exception to master servant liability, voluntary 
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence. See ARTHUR LARSON, 1-2 LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
LAW §§ 2.03, 2.07-2.08 (2005), http://www.lexis.com.  Some courts did temper these defenses in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s allowing more workers to gain compensation, however the bulk of workers injured on the job were left 
without compensation or with very little compensation.  Id. at § 2.04, 2.07.  See also Part IV. infra. See LARSON,
supra, at §4, 7.  These were also years of progress for the women’s suffrage movement.  Note that women’s rights to 
tort compensation were also limited from the 1800s to the modern period.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 
34-35.  See also Margo Schlanger, Injured Women Before Common Law Courts: 1860- 1930, 21 HARV. WOMEN’S
L.J. 79 (1998). 
202 Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 11 N.E. 1050, 1051-55 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that Buick owed a duty of care to 
the ultimate purchaser despite the absence of privity); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 38 
203 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 53 (Feinman puts the starting date at 1920).  The previous era (the late 1800s to early 
1900s) is often recognized as an era where the compensatory function of tort law was constricted.  EDWARD WHITE,
TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 61 (1980). 
204 There of course is the challenge that this should be left to legislators to decide.  Cf. Abel, supra note 37.  
205 Sovereign immunity from suit was abandoned in France by 1905.  The first case to undermine the doctrine 
occurred in 1873 with the Tribunal des Conflicts cases of l’arrêt Blanco TC 8 Feb 1873, D.1873.17 (according 
jurisdiction to the administrative courts for actions brought against the state for damages caused by actions of 
persons employed in the public service) and the doctrine was solidified by 1905 in the case of Tomaso Grecco, CE 
10 Feb 1905, D.1906.3.81.  See DUNCAN FAIRGRAVE, STATE LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12-13 
(2001). 
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making the state and the people equal before the law.206 The 1960s saw the passing of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, which provided statutory tort actions for discrimination in employment, 
housing, education, or in public accommodations on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or 
religion.207 Developments also came in the area of consumer protection and products liability,208 
which were crystallized in the Restatement Second of Torts in 1965.209 Comparative fault did 
not begin to overtake the draconian rule/defense of contributory negligence (which in many 
cases completely barred a plaintiff from bringing a claim if she was at all negligent) until the 
1970s.210 The general no duty rule in torts (the rule that one is not responsible for others and has 
no positive duties towards them) was also narrowed during the 1970s when courts started 
imposing duties on people in “special relations” with others (e.g., psychiatrists and patients, 
common carriers and passengers, schools and their pupils, landlords and tenant, and business and 
their customers).211 These reforms helped consolidate democracy by providing enforcement 
mechanisms for hard won democratic rights as well as by making it easier for those whose rights 
had been violated to access the justice system and vindicate those rights. 
2.  Regressive tort reform 
The Tort Policy Working Group from the Ronald Reagan-Edwin Meese justice 
department, one of the main catalysts of the counter-revolution in torts, came to life, in part, 
 
206 See FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 56-57; DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §268 (2001).  England also followed suit 
in 1947 with the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947, although vestiges of immunity still exist.  FAIRGRAVE, supra note 
205, at 12, 14-16. 
207 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2001) (Equal Employment Opportunities). 
208 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).  See also FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 55-56.  
Rustad and Koenig note a whole range of progressive decisions by the California courts during this era.  Rustad & 
Koenig, supra note 21, at 45-49. 
209 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).  
210 Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1069-70.  
211 Id. at 1065-69. 
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because of the liability insurance crisis of the 1980s.212 The Group identified a number of 
‘causes’ of the so called “crisis” 213 and a set of recommendations or strategies for attacking the 
“crisis.”  They summarily excluded all other explanations besides the civil justice system and 
thus, unsurprisingly, their recommendations or strategies focused only on attacking that system, 
by:  
1) making it harder for injury victims to get into court, 
2) making it more difficult to win once they are there, and  
3) restricting damage recoveries for plaintiffs who do win.214 
This, in perhaps oversimplified terms, has guided the tort reform movement ever since.215 
a.  Keeping plaintiffs out of court 
There are a whole range of mechanisms or tactics that help reduce the number of claims 
made by potential plaintiffs (other than reducing negligence and making products safer).  One 
mechanism for keeping plaintiffs out of court has been to make it less attractive for lawyers to 
take cases, by putting limits on contingency fees, 216 and creating  “early offer” mechanisms 
(which include attorney fee limits) for economic damages which would preclude or make it very 
difficult to receive non-economic damages like pain and suffering.217 Another tactic is to make it 
 
212 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 25.    
213 The decline of fault as the basis for liability, the undermining of causation, the explosive growth in damage 
awards, and the high transaction costs of the system.  Id. at 26. 
214 Id. at 25, 27.  For a compelling argument that the liability insurance crises of the 70s, mid 80s and in 2001 were 
all due to the market interest rate returns on insurance company investments rather than personal injury claims see  
JOANNE DOROSHOW & J. ROBERT HUNTER, INSURANCE “CRISIS” OFFICIALLY OVER – MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
RATES HAVE BEEN STABLE FOR A YEAR 3 (2006), http://insurance-reform.org/pr/MMSOFTMARKET.pdf; see also,
Frank A. Perrecone & Lisa R. Fabiano, The Fleecing of Seriously Injured Medical Malpractice Victims in Illinois,  
26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527 (2006). 
215 Id. Note, the structure of this overview follows the structure of FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 27-46, but is not 
limited to its substance. 
216 Id. at 27-28. 
217 Id. at 29-30. 
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difficult for states to hire attorneys for complex litigation (e.g., tobacco and gun cases).218 And 
finally, one can make it harder for people to join together in class actions.219 
This last tactic has is embodied in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 which takes 
many class actions out of the state courts and puts them into the federal courts.220 The 
"federalization" of class actions may act to deny or impede plaintiff's access to justice for a 
number of reasons,221 including the relative difficulty of certifying classes in federal courts,222  
and the fact that the federal courts are overcrowded and appeals may cause undue delay.223 
Further, to the extent that conservatives have managed to take over the federal judiciary and/or to 
secure anti-litigation justices on the federal bench, one would expect more bias against plaintiffs 
in general and against class actions in particular.224 As will be shown below, access to courts can 
also be limited through the enforcement of arbitration agreements that often preclude class 
 
218 Id. at 30-31. 
219 Id. at 31-32.  
220 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1335(a)(1), 1453, 1603(b)(3), 
1711-15).  The literature on the act is extensive. See, e.g., Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, Symposium: Class 
Actions in the Gulf South and Beyond, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-Conceived Approach to Class 
Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695 (2006); see id. at 1696 n.1 for an extensive list of academic commentary on the 
Act (forty plus pieces).  As Klonoff and Herrmann state, “It is well known that under CAFA, most major class 
actions, including virtually all multistate class actions, will now be heard in federal court.” Id. at 1696. 
221 Allan Kanner, Interpreting the Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654 
(2006). 
222 The federal courts' reluctance to issue class certification is well documented (referring to S. Rep. No. 106-420, at 
57-59 (2000) (noting minority senators' views on CAFA)) (noting also that a review of forty-three class action cases 
involving life insurance marketing practices found that cases were nearly twice the certification in state court as in 
federal court) (referring to PUBLIC CITIZEN, UNFAIRNESS INCORPORATED: THE CORPORATE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 
CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS 85 (2003), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2B13.pdf). 
223 Kanner, supra note 221, at 1654.  For the view that class actions are undemocratic because they have led to 
substantive changes in the law, which did not go through the legislative process, see Martin H. Redish, Class 
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003). 
224 For an account of the Republican efforts to appoint conservatives to the bench since Reagan see, for example, 
Law, supra note 30, at 485-86 (noting that Reagan succeeded in making ideological considerations paramount: by 
one observer's count, over three-quarters of his circuit court appointees furthered his conservative agenda, with the 
balance appearing to reward the party faithful.  Id. at 490. 
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actions,225 and that, by definition, limit access to the courts, both in the first instance and as a 
matter of review.  
b.  Making it harder for plaintiff to win cases 
The more direct route to reducing claims is to change the liability rules to make it harder 
for plaintiffs to win when they get to court.  This has happened by making liability less strict in 
products liability cases,226 setting up procedural obstacles in medical malpractice cases,227 and by 
providing immunity from suit for certain industries.228 This has been the case with gun 
manufacturers229 as well as biomaterials manufacturers.230 This will also make it less likely that 
plaintiffs and their lawyers will sue in the first place. 
c.  Capping damages and making punitive damages harder to get 
Finally, one of the most active areas of tort reform has centered around limiting damages, 
and this has happened by placing limits on joint and several liability,231 limiting the collateral 
 
225 See Part IV.B.4 infra.
226 See FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 34-40.  See Part IV infra. In fact the move is to return certain forms of products 
liability to a negligence standard.  
227 See, e.g., Thomas Baker who, commenting on the effect of the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study (HMPS), 
notes that “policymakers have seized on the weakest aspect of the HMPS, the analysis of the validity of medical 
malpractice claims, and used that analysis to justify imposing caps on damages in medical malpractice cases and 
additional procedural hurdles for medical malpractice claimants.  For that reason the practical impact of the HMPS 
may well have been to expand the gap between the large number of people who are injured by medical malpractice 
and the few people who are compensated and to increase the likelihood that the compensation that is received will 
be inadequate.” Thomas Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Malpractice Study: Conclusions About the 
Validity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 501, 511 (2005). 
228 This also echoes the reinvigorated state immunity doctrine of the Supreme Court.  See Part IV.B.5 infra.
229 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 33; Daniel Feldman, Legislating or Litigating Public Policy Change: Gunmaker Tort 
Liability 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 140 (2004); But see the repeal of immunity in California, John Fowler, Will a 
Repeal of Gun Manufacturer Immunity from Civil Suits Untie the Hands of the Judiciary?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV.
339 (2003).  
230 FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 33-34.  See also James D. Kerouac, Note, A Critical Analysis of the Biomaterials 
Access Assurance Act of 1998 as Federal Tort Reform Policy, B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 327 (2001). 
231 See, e.g., the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies’ report on Joint and Several Liability Rule 
Reform.  Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Joint and Several Liab. Reform States, 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/JointAndSeveralLiability.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).   
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source rule,232 and capping non-economic damages,233 including both punitive damages,234 and 
pain and suffering damages. 235 In addition to placing caps on punitive damages, tort reform has 
also included legislation that increases the burden of proof on the plaintiff in order to receive 
punitive damages.236 As Michael L. Rustad explains,   
 
Forty-five out of the fifty-one jurisdictions either do not recognize punitive 
damages or have enacted one or more restrictions on the remedy since 1979. 
These reforms include capping punitive damages, bifurcating the amount of 
punitive damages from the rest of the trial, raising the burden of proof, allocating 
a share of punitive damages to the state, and restricting use of evidence of 
corporate wealth. The handful of jurisdictions that have yet to enact tort reforms 
are mostly punitive damages cold spots rather than tort hellholes.237 
232 See Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Collateral Source Rule Reform, 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).  Note that according 
to Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, forty-four states have enacted legislation allowing for the 
consideration of the payment of collateral source benefits.  Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The 
Collateral Source Rule and Its Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 61 app.1 (2005) 
(arguing that tort reform designed to undermine the collateral source rule is the product of defense oriented public 
interest group lobbying and has resulted in arbitrary wealth transferring legislation that not only undermines the 
legitimate purposes of tort law, namely, compensation, indemnity, restitution and deterrence, but is economically 
unsound).  
233 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Non-Economic Damage Reform, 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/NoneconomicDamage.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).   
234 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Mut. Ins. Cos., Punitive Damage Reform, 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/PunitiveDamage.asp (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). 
235 See, e.g., FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 40-46.  Medical malpractice reform is one very significant area of regressive 
reform.  Nockleby & Curreri believe that reform efforts in this area can be traced to the abandonment of the locality 
rule of practice which undermined the "conspiracy of silence" by holding doctors to a national standard of care.  
Nockleby & Curreri, supra note 1, at 1023. 
236 See, e.g., JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES TREATISE § 4:60 CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE STANDARD (3rd ed.) (WL database updated April 2006);  See also 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 706 VI. 
Practice and Procedure B. Evidence 1. Burden; Sufficiency of Proof, Punitive or exemplary and multiple damages 
(WL database updated May 2006) (requiring clear and convincing evidence and in some jurisdictions, proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt). 
237 Rustad, supra note 40, at 1300. 
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All of these mechanisms undermine achievements from the 60s and 70s which made it 
easier for relatively weak and unorganized victims to organize and to access justice to vindicate 
their rights.  They undermine the deterrent effects of tort law designed to keep consumers safe 
and hold those who profit from placing dangerous products into the stream of commerce 
responsible for those products.  These changes benefit the few at the expense of the majority of 
Americans. 
d.  Illegal Americans revisited 
It should come as little surprise that there has been regressive tort reform at the federal 
level in the area of prison litigation that achieves all three goals, i.e. making it harder for 
prisoners to get into court, making it more difficult to win once they are there, and restricting 
damage recoveries for them when they do win.238  As James Robertson notes,  
 
The [Prison Litigation Reform Act] constrains inmates by requiring them to 
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit; pay filing fees; and forgo 
damages for emotional injuries absent a prior physical injury.  While the Act 
permits the judiciary to sua sponte dismiss claims failing to state a cause of 
action, its power to grant prospective relief cannot extend beyond correcting the 
right in question; and the relief can be terminated within two years or, in some 
instances, sooner. In addition, the Act caps fees for attorneys and special 
masters.239 
238 Prison Litigation Reform Act Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
239 James Robertson, The Jurisprudence of the PLRA: Inmates as "Outsiders" and the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 188-189 (2002).  President William Clinton signed this bill into law. 
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These reforms severely limit victims’ rights to access to justice and compensation for the 
violation of their rights.  The extent of the limits placed on prisoners, the most vulnerable and 
politically disempowered minority population in America is particularly troubling.  It is the most 
drastic demonstration of the symbiotic relationship between the loss of political equality and the 
further erosion of rights through regressive tort reform. 
B.  The Role of the Supreme Court in Regressive Tort “Reform” 
For the greater part of the history and evolution of American tort law, the U.S. the 
Supreme Court has not been a central actor.  Few, if any, of the major advances in tort law 
during the 60s and 70s are credited to that institution.240 This is because tort law is traditionally 
either a part of state common law or state and federal statutory law.  Heavy involvement by the 
Supreme Court in either of these areas raises the possibility of activism, either in the form of the 
court overstepping boundaries based on federalism concerns or overstepping boundaries based 
on separation of powers concerns.  Of course, it may be contended that either the states or 
Congress has overstepped rather than the Supreme Court.  In either event, significant legal 
change in the area of civil litigation and torts at the Supreme Court level signals that something 
more significant than the normal ebb and flow of state based tort reform initiatives is afoot.  
While the wave of tort reform beginning in the 1980s is not generally credited to the Supreme 
Court,241 the Court has played a very strong supporting role in that movement, both in its 
rhetoric,242 and in its decisions during the last two decades.  The court has had a significant 
impact on the broader category of civil litigation, and this impact is commensurate with 
 
240 See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 105 app.1.  The notable exception is in the area of the first 
amendment.   
241 Most of it has been carried out state by state through legislation and in their courts.  See e.g., FEINMAN, supra 
note 9, at 44.  
242 Note the many jibes in the cases limiting the ability of plaintiffs to seek relief in the courts.  Siegel, supra note 
29, at 1124 n.102 (mainly coming from Scalia).  Note also the rhetoric in the punitive damages cases of damages 
“running wild.”  Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991) (hereinafter Haslip).   
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regressive tort reform in general.  The Supreme Court, has, in effect put its imprimatur on the 
movement.   
Andrew Siegel in a careful and thorough piece paints a picture of the Rehnquist Court as 
a Court with an overarching hostility to litigation.243 As Siegel states, “In case after case and in 
wildly divergent areas of the law, the Rehnquist Court has expressed a profound hostility to 
litigation.”244 Siegel’s point is not to dismiss the voluminous existing explanatory narratives of 
the Court such as, federalism, conservatism, or even judicial supremacy, but to show that they 
are incomplete and misleading without an understanding of the Court’s hostility to litigation.245 
This hostility is not an even handed hostility to all litigants alike.  It manifests itself most 
prominently to the disadvantage of plaintiffs, and common people, and to the advantage of 
defendants and legal fictions, namely states and other corporate entities. 246 Siegel finds it 
curious that this hostility coexists with “the Court’s concurrent commitment to an aggressive 
form of judicial supremacy”247 and he explores a range of explanatory vectors, not least of 
which is the strong correlation between a conservative social vision and the cases in which the 
Court has shown the most hostility to litigation as well as when it seems to most zealously 
promote its own supremacy.248 Other explanatory vectors include an oversimplified view of 
 
243 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1097.  Although Siegel is not the first to identify this attitude, he is the first to draw it 
out as an overarching theme of the court.  For earlier, more partial references to the idea, See Vicki C. Jackson, 
Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L. J. 
691, 706-19 (2000) (identifying "hostility to litigation" as one of the themes behind the court’s 1999 sovereign 
immunity decisions). 
244 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1117.  While I track Siegel’s treatment of the Court’s hostility to litigation the treatment 
below focuses on how that hostility translates into undermining democratic values. 
245 Id. at 1102.  
246 As Siegel notes, “Any survey of the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation, however cursory, must begin with 
the obvious: In myriad ways, the Court has made life very difficult for civil plaintiffs.”  Id. at 1117.  Siegel notes 
that while the court is generally hostile to litigation, it treats “plaintiffs’ litigation” as particularly “demeaning and 
disreputable.”  Id. at 1201.  
247 Id. at 1098. 
248 Id. at 1199-1200.  
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separation of powers,249 and the structure and sociology of the American legal profession within 
which there is a tendency for the best trained and best connected lawyers (including the 
members of the Court and their associates) to congregate in civil defense and constitutional 
litigation rather than in personal injury.250 
The democracy based explanation, which is not directly pursued by Siegel, but which is 
consistent with both Supreme Court elitism and certain aspects of a conservative social vision, is 
that the Court lacks sufficient concern for democratic values.  The point is not to simply trot out 
the old hobby horse of counter-majoritarianism (i.e., the court is an activist Court with little 
respect for other democratic institutions)251 but that many of the Court’s decisions undermine 
democratic accountability and fail to accord equal concern and respect for everyone who is 
affected by its decisions.  
Those cases which evidence the Court’s hostility to litigation most directly include cases 
involving the Court’s reluctance to provide remedies for those persons whose rights have been 
violated, official immunity and fee shifting statutes cases, punitive damages cases, cases that 
involve the Federal Arbitration Act and state sovereign immunity cases. 
 
249 Id. at 1200-1201.  Although Siegel sees this as one possible explanatory vector, he notes that it is not an 
explanation that is consistent with a number of the court’s decisions.  Id. at n.458 (referring to the discussion in the 
text accompanying footnotes 109-110.  The implausibility of this explanation is further explored below). 
250 Id. at 1202. 
251 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the 
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2002); Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L. J. 
481, 495 (2002); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 130 (2001).  Note that 
courts are not categorically counter-majoritarian.  Given the evidence above concerning the “representative” 
branches and Richard Abel’s work, there is no reason to think that the courts are less likely to provide 
democratically justifiable decisions in the area of torts.  Abel, supra note 37. 
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1.  Constricting remedies 
A number of authors have commented on the Court’s constriction of remedies for those 
whose rights have been violated.252 Andrew Siegel, who analyzes four paradigm cases,253 out of 
many, 254 in which the Rehnquist Court has undermined the traditional view that rights imply 
remedies for their violation,255 notes that in every case there was an acknowledged or assumed 
injury to a defined legal interest and there was Supreme Court precedent supporting relief.256 
The Court, at times, attempts to justify these decisions on democratic grounds.257 Siegel 
phrases the court’s democratic justification in terms of ensuring that coercive sanctions are not 
imposed without careful communal deliberation.258 This line of argument is rooted in separation 
of powers concerns, namely concerns that the courts not encroach on the prerogatives of 
representative institutions to make the law and determine whether there should be remedies for 
the breach of law.259 In a number of these cases, the Court appears to engage in a dialogue with 
 
252 See Goldberg, supra note 15; Christopher J. Roederer, Another Case in Lochner’s Legacy, The Court’s Assault 
on New Property, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 321, 341-42, 342-351, 360 (2006); Andrew Siegel & Daniel J. Meltzer, The 
Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343 (2002); Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The 
Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L. J. 223 (2003). 
253 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (no private right of action exists to enforce the disparate impact 
regulations barring entities who receive federal funds from adopting policies that have the "effect" of discriminating 
on the basis of race); Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (Bivens action (private remedy for 
Constitutional right violation not available for a federal prisoner held in a private correctional facility in a claim 
against the corporation for violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment."); 
Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (a remedial provision of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not provide a right of recovery); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 
U.S. 273 (2002) (private individuals harmed by violations of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 
(FERPA) cannot seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  
254 Siegel lists several cases but does not include Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796 (2005) (dismissing 
respondent’s case for failing to establish that she had a property right in the enforcement of a mandatory restraining, 
thereby failing to establish that she had a right that was worthy of procedural due process protection which would 
provide a right to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).  
255 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1118-1129. 
256 Id. at 1122.  
257 Id. at 1129.   
258 Id.
259 Siegel refers to Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 204, 67-69 (2002) which discusses a number of cases 
limiting remedies to civil litigants on the grounds of separation of powers.  Siegel, supra note 29, at n.119. 
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Congress and or the states, imploring them to speak more clearly if they wish to create private 
remedies.260 
However, it is difficult for this explanation of the Court’s decisions to hold up, given the 
Court’s assault on §1983 claims, for that assault is in direct conflict with the spirit and the letter 
of §1983 under which Congress explicitly provided for the right to a remedy for the violation of 
federal law, including constitutional law.261 This is not only evidenced by some of the cases 
mentioned above, including Gonzaga and Castle Rock, but also in cases where the court has 
expanded official immunity from damages under §1983 and its decisions which make it harder to 
recoup attorneys fees under §1983.262 These decisions fly in the face of democratic concerns, 
not only by undermining “democratically” passed legislation but by undermining mechanisms 
designed to help consolidate and protect democratic rights.  
A similar pattern is found in the Court’s expansion of the doctrine of qualified immunity 
over the last twenty years which has resulted in more stringent standards for determining a 
clearly established right as well as greater tolerance for errors of judgments on the part of 
officials claiming the immunity.263 The result is that it is harder in these cases for victims who 
have had recognized rights violated to vindicate those rights.264 
260 Siegel refers to Gonzaga University v. Does, 536 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2002) (describing the need for congress to 
speak clearly of its intention to create a private remedy).  Siegel, supra note 29.  See also Castle Rock, 125 S. Ct. at 
2806 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-803.5(a)–(b) (1999)).  It is questionable whether the Court in Castle Rock was 
genuine.  See Roederer, supra note 252, at, 341-42, 342-351, 360. 
261 Oddly, the Court uses arguments and policy drawn from implied right of actions cases (under which separation of 
powers concerns justifiably act to limit the court in creating rights of action) to limit §1983 claims.  This is odd 
because §1983 was specifically enacted to provide rights of action and thus the Court is undermining the separation 
of powers when it denies such claims.  See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1126; Roederer, supra note 252, at 321-69. 
262 See Siegel, supra note 29, at 1126, 1130.  
263 Id. at 1130-31 n.123 (also see the cases cited therein); see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per 
curium).  But see the handful of cases where the Court has limited overly expansive interpretations/ applications of 
immunity by circuit courts for example, Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (holding that the circuit court 
erred in applying a "rigid gloss" to the qualified immunity standard that denied relief to tort plaintiffs if there was no 
prior case with "materially similar" facts where a constitutional violation had been established); Johnson v. Jones, 
515 U.S. 304, 307 (1995) (unanimously holding, contrary to the position of a number of circuits, that an order 
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2.  Access to Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting legislation allowing for those suing to vindicate civil rights to claim 
attorney’s fees when they prevailed in their cases constituted a very important and progressive 
development for civil litigants.265 This development accompanied the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and was later incorporated into the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Act of 1976.  That reform 
helped to ensure that the rights won on paper, and which evidence the coming of age of 
American democracy, could actually be vindicated in practice.  This reform not only made it 
easier for victims to obtain counsel, bring claims, and receive remedies for the wrongs they 
suffered, but it had the further purpose and effect of keeping those hard won democratic gains on 
track.  Plaintiffs in these cases are not merely vindicating private wrongs but helping vindicate 
and deter public wrongs. 
Again, however, the Rehnquist Court has whittled away at this mechanism for 
vindicating those rights which help keep democracy on track.  It has done so by narrowing down 
the class of “prevailing plaintiffs” and it has done this by devaluing the importance of having the 
Constitution, and one’s rights under the Constitution, vindicated.  In other words the devaluation 
of constitutional rights is not merely the result of this practice, but is in fact the means through 
which it is achieved.  The Court has denied “prevailing party” status to plaintiffs in cases where 
 
denying summary judgment in a qualified immunity case because of uncertainty about the factual sufficiency of the 
allegations was not immediately appealable). 
264 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1131-32.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist 
Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 482-84 (2002); Jackson, supra note 243, at 691, 707 
(locating the Supreme Court's 1999 sovereign immunity decisions in the context of a variety of other anti-litigation 
initiatives of the Rehnquist Court and offering the Court's "hostility to litigation" as one of many overlapping themes 
motivating those decisions).  David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial 
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine is 
based on right wing judicial activism).  The push for the immunity of corporate entities is not confined to the state.  
FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 33-34. 
265 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 29, at 1136.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243, tit. II & tit. 
VII; see, e.g., Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1622, 1623, 1636; Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990,  Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328. 
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the decision that the plaintiffs’ rights had been violated were not entered into a formal 
declaratory judgment or injunction, when although entered into judgment they did not provide a 
“substantial benefit” to the claimant, where the claimant only receives nominal damages, and/ or 
where the claimant whose suit compels the abandonment of an illegal practice or rule is not 
accompanied by a binding judicial decree.266 
These cases appear to deny the congressionally mandated relief on rather narrow and 
technical grounds which are not supported by the separation of powers or the democracy-
reinforcing purposes of the provisions themselves.  The cases which narrowly read “prevailing 
party” to exclude those whose rights are vindicated but whose damages are nominal or 
insubstantial, completely undervalues the federal and constitutional rights these provisions were 
designed to help safeguard.  The fact that money damages are inadequate or inappropriate in 
some of these cases, or that specific performance is more appropriate does not mean that a 
vindication of the right is less important or valuable.  It demeans the legislation and the rights it 
was designed to protect to act as if it was designed to only protect losses that could be, or are, 
converted into money damages.  Further, to deny the shifting of fees in these cases does the most 
damage to the purpose of the legislation, which was to encourage these types of suits.267 This is 
because it is exactly in those cases where there are few monetary damages that it will be most 
difficult for plaintiffs to secure adequate legal representation.  Without monetary damages or fee 
shifting the attorney’s fees must come from the plaintiff.  
 
266 See e.g., Siegel, supra note 29, at 1137.  See also Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 759-60 (1987); Rhodes v. 
Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1988) (per curiam); Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992); Buckhannon Bd. & Care 
Home v. W. Va. Dept’s of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605(1994). 
267 See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 436 (1991). 
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3.  Punitive Damages 
The Supreme Court has also weighed in on punitive damages.  The Rehnquist Court, 
unlike any Court before, has sought to limit the availability of punitive damages.  Siegel is 
correct to point out that punitive damages are something of a lightning rod for tort reform 
advocates, yet he is incorrect to think that this is because they “represent a substantial share of 
the costs of our current regime.”268 Punitive damages are in fact very rare269 and although 
awards may be extreme in some cases, the numbers are not significant in light of the vast 
majority of cases.270 
The changes in this area have gone from requiring certain procedural safeguards to 
substantive limits on the amount of damages.271 Not unlike the fee shifting limitation, here the 
 
268 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1148.  See, e.g., Rustad & Koenig, supra note 21, at 60-65.  Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: Empirical Analyses Using the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 1992, 
1996, and 2001 Data, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2006) (hereinafter Eisenberg et al., State Courts), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=912309.  As Eisenberg has stated elsewhere, “Misperceptions about juries and punitive 
damages are especially strong.  Contrary to popular belief, juries rarely award such damages, and award them 
especially rarely in products liability and medical malpractice cases.  Rather, juries tend to award punitive damages 
in intentional misconduct cases.  When juries do award punitive damages, they do so in ways that relate strongly to 
compensatory awards.”  Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 745 (2002) (hereinafter Eisenberg et al., Empirical Study). 
269 Eisenberg found that judges award punitive damages in about 4% of decided cases and juries in about 5% of 
decided cases.  Eisenberg et al., State Courts, supra note 268, at 268.  However, given that these numbers reflect 
cases in which plaintiffs win, they only represent about half of all cases tried, and since less than 5% of cases go to 
court, while the rest settle, and this makes the number of punitive damages cases quite de minimus (below 3 in 
10,000).  
270 Eisenberg’s study indicates that most cases involve awards of under $100,000 (60%); over 23% are under 
$10,000, and less than 11% are over 1 million.  Id. at 270.  
271 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003) (striking down a damage award as 
excessive); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 426, 448 (2001) (holding that 
appellate courts should review trial court determinations as to the constitutionality of punitive damage awards de 
novo); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996) (striking down a damage award as excessive); 
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 418 (1994) (holding that the lax standard for appellate review of punitive 
damages mandated by the Oregon Constitution violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); 
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446, 465-66 (1993) (reviewing a punitive damage award for 
excessiveness but finding it within constitutional limits); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24 (reviewing both Alabama's 
method of assessing punitive damages and the magnitude of an award in a particular case but finding no 
constitutional problem); Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 259-60 (1989) (holding that 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive damage awards and declining to set 
aside a punitive damage award as excessive); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 76-80 (1988) 
(discussing but declining to answer on prudential grounds major constitutional questions regarding punitive damage 
awards).  See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. 
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Court pegs its substantive limits to compensatory damages,272 thus making cases that do not 
involve high levels of economic damages harder to bring.273 Again, like in the fee shifting cases, 
limiting punitive damages, particularly in this fashion, reduces the efficacy of punitive damages 
as a way of deterring the egregious behavior of defendants.  Whereas above the Court was 
undermining the role that fee shifting played in securing federal and constitutional rights, here, 
limitations on punitive damages also limits the public policy role that punitive damages play in 
deterring some of the worst forms of corporate irresponsibility.274 
4.  Arbitration Clauses (contracting out of defending claims in court, etc.) 
The Court has also gone out of its way to broadly construe the Federal Arbitration Act. 
As was noted above, contracting out of courts and into arbitration is one way of circumventing 
an institution that is unresponsive to special interest pressures.  There may be a tendency to think 
that since arbitration is as a form of alternative dispute resolution it is thereby progressive.275 At 
the very least some might think that it is no less progressive than regular litigation and should be 
given equal footing.  Although the Court’s recognition of arbitration may have begun as an effort 
to put arbitration on an equal footing with litigation, it has ended up as “a policy-driven assault 
 
REV. 1 (2004). Another punitive damages case, Philip Morris USA v. Williams (05-1256), is before the Supreme 
Court this term. 
272 In State Farm, although the Court would not make a bright line ratio, it stated that “…in practice, few awards 
exceeding a single–digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due 
process.”  State Farm, 538 U.S. at 410.  However, the Court did note that “ratios greater than those that this Court 
has previously upheld may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small 
amount of economic damages.”  Id. (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 581-82). 
273 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1147.  
274 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L. J. 347, 355 (2003); DAN B. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §381 (2000); FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 42- 46.  Siegel notes that the Court is 
particularly hostile to litigation in cases like punitive damages where litigation is meant to achieve greater societal 
purposes.  Siegel, supra note 29, at 1160 n.255. 
275 As Garthy notes, “mandatory arbitration . . . . gained support from idealistic academic studies . . . . promoting 
“procedural justice.”  The idea was that arbitration allows individuals to tell their stories, and therefore litigants 
perceive the process as a more legitimate form of justice than the usual result of litigation-a negotiated settlement. 
Both mediation and arbitration contain a tradition-now seemingly muted-that the results are supposed to be better 
than strict enforcement of the law.”  Garthy, supra note 195. 
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on the wisdom and propriety of litigation as a mechanism for resolving such disputes.”276 There 
is little question that arbitration has its benefits, particularly in terms of costs to the parties.  For 
equal bargaining partners arbitration may in fact be superior to litigation.   
The Court’s practice, however, has been to ignore the bargaining disparities of the 
parties.  As Siegel states, “[i]t has consistently enforced form arbitration agreements that shift 
cases from courts to alternative forums without regard for the practical consequences to potential 
plaintiffs.”277 There are at least five significant effects of allowing companies to bind consumers 
(and smaller, less powerful companies) to arbitration.  First, the company gets to choose a venue 
that is more congenial.  Second, it gets a forum that has less due process than a court has,278 e.g. 
in terms of discovery, the right to a jury,279 and judicial review.  Third, it can oust the possibility 
of punitive damages.  Fourth, it can eliminate the possibility of victims joining together in class 
 
276 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1141. 
277 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1117-1118.  The literature critiquing the court on this point is vast. See e.g., Paul D. 
Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 401 (1996) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence will allow "birds of prey" to "sup on workers, consumers, shippers, 
passengers, and franchisees"); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and 
Consumer Right Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 33, 36 (1997) ("The Supreme 
Court has created a monster."); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process 
Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (critiquing arbitration case law for increasingly favoring arbitral forums without 
regard for basic fairness or rule of law norms); See also e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise 
of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1996); Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with 
Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293 (1999); Paul H. Haagen, 
New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039 
(1998); David M. Kinnecome, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Are Arbitral Procedures a Method of Weakening 
the Substantive Protections Afforded by Employment Rights Statutes?, 79 B. U. L. REV. 745 (1999); Lewis L. 
Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 (1998); Margo 
E. K. Reder, Arbitrating Securities Industry Employment Discrimination Claims: Restructuring a System to Ensure 
Fairness, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 19 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has 
Pre-Dispute [Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069 (1998); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 637 (1996); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 831 (2001). 
278 “Just as important to anyone concerned with the morality of law is the fact that the arbitrator can decide a case 
without regard for the law or the facts in a case.  There is no predictable outcome, no procedural protection.” 
Deborah W. Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank Easterbrook,
16 TOURO L. REV 1205, 1236 (2000).  See also Garthy, supra note 195.   
279 This arguably undermines one of the main democratic components of our system of justice (both civil and 
criminal). 
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actions to bring suit.280 Finally, as Richard Posner states, parties are not entitled to awards that 
are “correct or even reasonable, since neither error nor clear error, nor even gross error is a 
ground for vacating an award.”281 All of these factors benefit the few at the expense of the 
majority. As Garthy suggests,  
 
It is not the simplistic bias of decision-making structured for the employers or 
companies to win.  Instead, the bias is found in a system in which only a few 
constituencies are comfortable making their arguments and confident that their 
concerns will be understood, even if they lose some cases.  The bias is also in a 
process that selects neutrals that will be safe for the leading lawyers and clients-
whoever controls the selection-and rejects those who appear too political, too 
unreliable, or too risky even on the basis of cultural stereotypes.282  
This is about as undemocratically tailored as a justice system can be.  It is perfectly suited 
for employers and companies who are repeat players and everyone else, must simply take it, or 
go without.283 Deborah Post, in describing the 7th Circuit case of Hill v. Gateway 2000 Inc.,284 
280 Eliminating class actions means that many consumers with small harms simply won’t pursue claims, thereby 
allowing business to defraud large numbers of consumers in small amounts.  FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 104.  It is 
only through joining as a class that they can in any way approximate the power of big business.  Id. at 80; see also 
Post, supra note 278, at 1226.  In Gateway, Justice Easterbrook upheld an “arbitration agreement” that was not 
negotiated, but simply shipped with the plaintiff’s computer binding the plaintiff/consumer to its terms unless the 
consumer shipped the computer back to the manufacturer at the consumer’s own cost within 30 days (a rolling 
shrink wrap).  Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th. Cir. 1997) cert. denied 522 U.S. 808, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); 
see also FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 88.  This is just one way of forming binding contracts with little to no notice, 
much less bargaining. In addition to the normal boilerplate adhesion contract, others include shrink-wraps, browse-
wraps and click-wraps in which the agreement is packaged with the product, put on a website or on the computer 
screen to click.  FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 86.  
281 IDS Life Insurance Company v. Royal Alliance Associates, Inc, 266 F. 3d 645, 650-651 (7th Cir. 2001). 
282 Garthy, supra note 195, at 933. 
283 Just as the Court abandoned its fidelity of separation of powers, the Court here abandons its fidelity to federalism 
when into comes into conflict with its desire to limit access to the courts through the FAA.  Siegel, supra note 29, at 
62
states, “The Gateway case …threatens the democratic process on two levels. Not only does it 
create a model of contract formation that gives entire control over the terms of the agreement to 
one side, it also deprives the less powerful party, the individual consumer, of the only 
mechanism she has to directly confront behavior that is predatory, abusive or simply 
overreaching.”285 
5.  States Rights 
One of the most dramatic areas of constitutional change has been in the area of “states 
rights.”  The Court has brought new life to state sovereign immunity in a whole host of cases 
through a diverse set of mechanisms.286 The result, as with many of the cases above involving 
rights of action, qualified immunity, and arbitration, is that colorable claims are dismissed 
without regard for their merit.287 The result is that victims of illegal government conduct are 
denied access to justice.288 It also means that one important mechanism for holding government 
accountable to the people is eroded, and with it, respect for the rule of law. 
 
1142-3.  See e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (holding that the FAA preempts state law protecting 
access to courts in wage collection actions). 
284 Gateway, 105 F.3d 1147. 
285 Post, supra note 279, at 1235. 
286 Siegel summarizes the area: “the Court has reaffirmed and firmly constitutionalized the expansive and counter-
textual reading of the Eleventh Amendment . . . . , held that Congress may not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity under any of its Article I powers,  developed a fairly intrusive test to determine whether Congress has 
properly abrogated the states' immunity pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment powers, and applied that test with 
increasing rigor and scepticism.  At the same time, the Court has--without relying on the Eleventh Amendment or 
any other textual provision--held that the Constitution's structure requires that the states be accorded sovereign 
immunity from suits in their own courts (absent their consent) and from federal administrative proceedings that bear 
significant indicia of adjudication.  In a variety of less well-known cases, the Court has also narrowed the well-
established doctrine whereby individuals may, notwithstanding sovereign immunity, seek injunctions against state 
officials in their official capacity, made it easier for state officials to obtain dismissal of lawsuits on sovereign 
immunity grounds at an early stage in the litigation process, and overruled precedent suggesting that a state does not 
posses full Eleventh Amendment immunity when it engages in routine commercial activity.”  Siegel, supra note 29, 
at 1153-54 n.219-228. 
287 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1163. 
288 Id. 
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The justification for the revival of state immunity is a somewhat odd anthropomorphism 
of the state.289 The idea is that states are somehow endowed with sovereignty, the likes of which 
make them susceptible to moral harm or assaults to their dignity.  The concept is a throwback to 
the days in which Kings and Queens ruled the land, when they were “the sovereign” wholly 
capable of suffering indignity at the hands of others.  There is considerable debate as to whether 
or not dignity actually was the animating idea behind the 11th Amendment and sovereign 
immunity.290 The historical argument as to whether or not dignity was crucial to the 11th 
amendment and state sovereign immunity is somewhat wayward to the concerns of this article.  
Like many issues in legal history, there is ample authority on both sides.  
Even if dignity was the original rationale for the 11th Amendment, it was a different 
notion of dignity than the one called forth by the Court today.  The dignity referred to before 
consisted of the notion that sovereigns were equal and that it was inappropriate (or undignified) 
to subject one sovereign to the courts of another sovereign.291 This purportedly undermined the 
equality of sovereigns.292 However, the modern focus is on the indignity of being brought into 
court (even the state’s own court).  While the former view sounded in notions about the equality 
of sovereigns, if Siegel is correct, the modern notion is not animated by equality, but by a sort of 
elitism which places the state sovereign above its citizens.  As Siegel notes, “As the Court sees it, 
 
289 Siegel notes that Justice Thomas has provided the fullest articulation of the dignity principle, "[t]he preeminent 
purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord the States the dignity that is consistent with their status as 
sovereign entities."  Id. (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n, FMC v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743 
(2002)).  Siegel, supra note 29, at 1157. 
290 Note that the dignity rational for sovereign immunity was only used sporadically.  It came up in Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), and then in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 503 (1887).  It was only raised again in 
1959 where it was not relied upon.  Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276 n.1 (1959).  As the court 
pointed out in that case, “More than the dignity of a sovereign state was probably at issue, however.  When the 
Eleventh Amendment was proposed many states were in financial difficulties and had defaulted on their debts The 
states could therefore use the new amendment not only in defense of theoretical sovereignty but also in a more 
practical way to forestall suits by individual creditors!”  Id. (citing MARIAN D. IRISH ET AL., THE POLITICS OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 123 (1959)). 
291 This was the kind of dignity at play which was rejected by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia.  Siegel, 
supra note 29, at 1160. 
292 Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
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compelling an unwilling state to defend a private lawsuit for damages threatens state dignity for 
much the same reason and in much the same way that subjecting a private party to such a suit 
diminishes the dignity and threatens the status of that private party”293 In other words, it is part 
of a visceral reaction to having to defend oneself in court. 
However, modern states, be they national or federal, like corporations and associations, 
are artificial entities and do not possess the moral qualities needed to have dignity.  While the 
earlier conception of equal dignity of states vis-a-vis other states resonates with democratic 
impulses (although it too raises concerns in our global interdependent world),294 the modern form 
of the idea, is decidedly undemocratic.  Again, the idea is a throwback to pre-democratic times, 
when the sovereign made, imposed and was above the law.  This is inconsistent with notions of 
equality before the law.  The Court, in effect, is choosing to protect the “dignity” of the state 
over the rights of plaintiff citizens.  It is undermining “the rule of law” and equality before the 
law, thereby elevating “rule by the sovereign” and undermining democratic accountability.295 
V. CONCLUSION 
Given the findings in Parts II and III above, there is little hope that this work, or anyone 
else’s academic work, is going to revitalize American democracy on its own.  The present 
downward spiraling cycle will not be easy to reverse.  This is not to say that critical work has no 
 
293 Siegel, supra note 29, at 1162. 
294 See, e.g., DARREL MOELLENDORF, COSMOPOLITAN JUSTICE (2002) (critiquing John Rawls statist approach to 
global justice on Rawlsian grounds).  
295 Although beyond the scope of this paper, the present administration’s attack on the rule of law should be noted.  
The attack has taken many forms since the beginning of the “war on terror”, but a few recent examples include the 
president’s abuse of signing statements to selectively enforce the law as well as proposed amendments to the War 
Crimes Act to insulate government officials from suits based on war crimes committed against detainees.  See, e.g.,
Press Release, American Bar Association, Blue-Ribbon Task Force Finds President Bush’s Signing Statements 
Undermine Separation of Powers (July 24, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/news072406.html; and 
Jeffrey Smith, Detainee Abuse Charges Feared: Shield Sought From '96 War Crimes Act, WASHINGTON POST, July 
28, 2006, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/07/27/AR2006072701908_pf.html. 
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place or no chance of impact.  There is some hope that this piece, like the works of professors 
Abel, Baker, Feinman and Rustad, among others, will at least demystify what is at stake in 
modern tort reform.  Demystification is a necessary, although insufficient step towards 
transparency, accountability and a revitalized democracy.  Although many authors have come 
close to challenging tort “reform” on democratic few if any have chosen to be blunt. The 
arguments above were designed to place the present course of tort “reform” in sharp relief 
against the unreflective idea that the American ship of state and law has been sailing a steady 
democratic course for over two hundred years.  Sometimes its takes a clear sighting of the 
precipice before people are willing to change course.   
A prime example is captured in the American Law Institute Restatement (Third) of 
Products Liability.  Although the reporters’ sincerity is dubious in a number of respects,296 their 
“restatement” of the law placed the course of products liability in sharp relief against the path of 
the ALI Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A.  Their, perhaps overzealous, crystallization of:  
• the death of strict liability in product design and failure to warn cases (§2);  
• the death of the consumer expectations test, and the requirement that the plaintiff prove 
the existence of reasonable alternative design (§2(b));  
• the nearly complete immunity given to prescription drugs (§ 6(c)); and  
• the pass given to “unavoidably unsafe” products such as drugs, cigarettes and alcohol,297 
296 The fact that they attempt to maintain that their restatement is not political, but merely a restatement of existing 
laws is as hard to accept as their assertion that the choice between the risk-utility approach to products liability and 
the consumer expectation approach is merely a pragmatic choice, a matter of getting it right, like figuring out the 
boiling point of water, rather than a choice deeply rooted in political as well as principled considerations of justice.  
See James A. Henderson Jr. & Aron D. Twersky, What Europe, Japan and Other Countries Can Learn from the 
New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 14. (1999). 
297 Earlier outlines of the present work included a section depicting the rise of consumer protection and strict liability 
in democratically accountable Europe and the fall of strict liability and consumer protection in “manufacturer’s 
accountable America.”  Luke Nottage in his comparative study of products liability in Japan the U.S.  E.U., and 
Australia, depicts EU law as making steady pro-consumer progress from the 1960s to the present, Australia making 
rather steady progress from the 60s until about 2000, Japan making very little pro-consumer progress until 1994, 
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made it very clear just how far off course the law of products liability was going from the path of 
the Second Restatement, and what was being lost from the perspective of consumer protection 
and corporate responsibility.  Whether one thinks the Third Restatement was merely a cold but 
brutally accurate obituary or a politically motivated attempt to put a bounty on the head of strict 
liability, 298 it brought the issue out in stark relief.  As Ellen Wertheimer notes, “The Third 
Restatement . . . . made it impossible for courts to ignore what they had done, and many did not 
like what they saw.”299 
What they saw, once the dust settled, was that the risks and losses did not go away, but 
were simply shifted.  In fact, those risks and loses were shifted onto the shoulders of innocent 
consumers who are not only at a disadvantage from the perspective of making products safer, but 
who also are not equally equipped to insure for, absorb or spread the losses they suffer.300 
when it adopted its Product Liability Law which was modeled on the E.U. directive, and the United States, whose 
pro-consumer product liability law peaked in the early 80s and started a rather steep decline until the present.  Luke 
Nottage, Comparing Product Safety and Liability Law in Japan: From Minamata to Mad cows – and Mitsubishi, in 
PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 336 (Duncan Fairgrieve ed., 2005).  See also Geraint G. 
Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 985, 994 (1998); Josephine Liu, Two Roads Diverged in a Yellow Wood: The 
European Community Stays on the Path to Strict Liability, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.1940 (2004).  Cf. Reisman, supra 
note 67, at 801(somewhat more cautious about the E.U. being more protective of consumers); and cf. Jane Stapleton, 
Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 53-61 (1999) (arguing that 
the E.U. also uses a negligence standard in design and failure to warn cases). 
298 See, FEINMAN, supra note 9, at 40.  The idea that §2(b) represents a wish list for manufacturers has been 
repeatedly cited since it was first stated by Frank Vadall in 1997.  See, e.g., id.; Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: 
Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
889, 927 n.116 (2005); Aaron Arnold, Note, Rethinking Design Defect Law: Should Arizona Adopt the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 173, 174 (2003); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of 
Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1727 n.116 (2003) (quoting Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W. 
2d 727, 751 n.16 (Wis. 2001) (quoting Frank J. Vandall, Constructing a Roof Before the Foundation is Prepared: 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 261 
(1997)). 
299 Wertheimer, supra note 298.  Although she does note that some courts did follow the Third Restatement even 
though it conflicted with earlier precedent.  Id.
300 As Reisman notes, “In the United States, accident victims are not nearly protected comprehensively.  In 1997, 16 
% of all Americans and 37 % of the low-income population had no health coverage at all, and the number kept 
rising. Only 66 % of the adult workforce has disability benefits, and these benefits are usually less than ample.  All 
States have enacted workers compensation schemes but the compensation they pay is fairly low and often 
insufficient to make ends meet.  Overall, social and workers insurance cover only about three-fifths of the economic 
consequences of accidents, forcing victims to bear the remaining 40 % themselves.”  Reisman, supra note 67, at 
828. 
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Although the campaign to see the corporate producer as the symbol of American freedom -- like 
a mustang, tethered to a shrub in the desert of social-welfare tort law, being fed upon by greedy 
parasitic lawyers and consumers -- persists,301 the reality is that, when horses run wild, people 
get trampled.  Under the Third Restatement, those who trample (who profit from putting 
products into the stream of commerce, who are best placed to test and make products safe or 
warn of their hazards, and are best placed to insure against, absorb and spread the risks and 
losses) now have a much better chance at avoiding responsibility and liability for those losses.  
This not only raises the risk of being trodden upon (by undermining the deterrent effect of 
products liability law) but it also raises the risk that once trodden upon, the consumer must bear 
the loss.  
Although perhaps overly optimistic, Wertheimer’s argument, that “the courts are now in 
the process of reaffirming their commitment to retaining--or reinstating--the doctrine [of strict 
liability]” because they did not like what they saw, provides some hope that if people see clearly 
what is at stake in the current wave of tort reform, they may actually react progressively, putting 
torts back to work for democratic progress.    
 
301 See, e.g., Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom, Responsibility, and Risk: Fundamental Principles Supporting Tort 
Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 645 (“The free enterprise system is the engine that drives America’s healthy economy, 
the benefits of which necessarily include inherent risks. Unfortunately, many facets of America’s civil justice system 
operate to shift all of those risks to the entrepreneurs who produce the consumer goods and services that make 
people’s lives easier or more pleasant . . . . The tort system has undergone a transformation from one designed solely 
to redress wrongs to one focusing more and more on criminal-style retribution and redistribution of wealth.”).  
Although it is doubtful that this statement was ever true, it may have come closer to the truth some 30 years ago, but 
not today.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1  
Economic Inequality: Lowest 10% compared to medium income; Highest 10% compared to 
Medium income; the Decile ratio of P90/P10; and the Gini Coefficient.302 
COUNTRIES P10 P90 P90/P10 GINI 
Finland 2000 57% 164% 2.87719 0.247
Netherlands 1999 56% 167% 2.98214 0.248
Norway 2000 57% 159% 2.78947 0.251
Sweden 2000 57% 168% 2.94737 0.252
Germany 2000 54% 173% 3.2037 0.252
Austria 2000 55% 173% 3.1455 0.26
Luxembourg 2000 66% 215% 3.25758 0.26
Denmark 1992 54% 155% 2.8704 0.263
Belgium 2000 53% 174% 3.283 0.277
Switzerland 2000 54% 182% 3.3704 0.28
France 1994 54% 191% 3.537 0.288
Canada 2000 48% 188% 3.9167 0.302
Ireland 2000 41% 189% 4.6098 0.323
Italy 2000 44% 199% 4.5227 0.333
Spain 2000 44% 209% 4.75 0.34
United Kingdom 1999 47% 215% 4.5745 0.345
United States 2000 39% 210% 5.3846 0.369
Average 51.76% 184% 3.65 0.28765
Standard Deviation 6.94 19.83 0.812 0.04 
Table 2  
Inequality: Gini Coefficients before and after taxes and benefits303 
State Market Gini Post-benefits reduction 
Finland 38 25 34%
Netherlands 39 25 36%
Sweden 45 25 44%
Austria 43 26 39%
302 Brandolini & Smeeding, supra note 58, at 22 fig.1. 
303 Table based on data extracted from A Brandolini & T Smeedling Figure 2 (based on the Luxemburg Income 
Study).  Brandolini & Smeedling, supra note 58, at fig.2.    
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Germany 46 26 42%
Belgium 47 28 41%
France 49 29 47%
Canada 41 30 27%
Switzerland 39 30 20%
Ireland 44 32 27%
Italy 46 33 27%
Spain 47 34 28%
United Kingdom 50 35 31%
United States 47 37 22%
Average 44.36 29.64 33.21%
Table 3 
Inequalities in Wealth: Gini Coefficients Based on Net Worth304 
State Gini 
Japan .547
Spain  .565
Italy  .609
Australia .622
Netherlands  .649
Canada  .663
Germany  .671
France  .73
United Kingdom  .73
United States  .801
Switzerland  .803
Average .6718
Stand. Deviation .0864
Table 4  
VAP statistics by country305 
Country VAP 
Parliamentary 
voter turnout 
1945-2001 
304 Table based on data taken from Davies et al., supra note 69, at tbl.10b.  
305 Derived from statistics of averages of voting age population ratios across 169 countries in parliamentary elections 
from 1945-2001 compiled by the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance.  PINTOR ET AL., 
supra note 111, at 75, 83-84. 
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Italy 92% 
Belgium 85% 
Austria 84% 
Sweden 84% 
Netherlands 84% 
Denmark 84% 
Canada 83% 
Germany 80% 
Norway 79% 
Finland 78% 
Spain 76% 
Ireland 75% 
United Kingdom 74% 
France 67% 
Luxembourg 64% 
Switzerland 52% 
United States 48% 
Average 76% 
Table 5  
Unicef Child Well-Being Table306 
1 Netherlands 
2 Sweden 
3 Denmark 
4 Finland 
5 Spain 
6 Switzerland 
7 Norway 
8 Italy 
9 Republic of Ireland 
10 Belgium 
11 Germany 
12 Canada 
13 Greece 
14 Poland 
15 Czech Republic 
16 France 
17 Portugal 
306 Derived from INNOCENTI RESEARCH CENTRE, supra note 77, at 2 (this ranking is a combined ranking based on: 
material well-being, family and peer relationships, health and safety, behavior risks, and both educational well-being 
and subjective well-being).   
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18 Australia 
19 Hungary 
20 United States 
21 United Kingdom 
